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VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTING IN THE INFORMATION
AGE
by
D. Gordon Smith"
Entrepreneurs encounter moral hazard and adverse selection risks when "hiring"
venture capitalists to invest money and perform value-added services. The explicit
terms of venture capital contracts do not fully protect entrepreneurs against these
risks, but venture capitalist reputation may assist the entrepreneur by serving as a
nonlegal sanction against moral hazard problems and as a sorting device counter-
ing adverse selection problems. This Article describes the market for reputation
among the venture capitalists and examines the effect of the World Wide Web on
that market. This Article suggests that the increased accessibility of information
about venture capital firms will improve the efficiency of the market for reputa-
tion, thus enhancing the ability of entrepreneurs to reduce the risks of moral haz-
ard and adverse selection. This Article concludes with speculations about the effect
of this improved market for reputation on venture capital contracts.
I. INTRO DU CTIO N ..................................................................... 134
II. AGENCY COSTS IN VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING ........ 136
A. Principal-Agent Theory in Venture Capital Investing .............. 137
B. Venture Capital Investing as a Cooperative Relationship ......... 138
C. The Entrepreneur's Moral Hazard Problem ........................... 140
D. The Entrepreneur's Adverse Selection Problem ........................ 143
III. MITIGATING AGENCY COSTS THROUGH VENTURE
CAPITAL CONTRACTS ........................................................... 144
A. Forms of Venture Capital Contracts ...................................... 144
B. Protecting Entrepreneurs Through Venture Capital Contracts... 150
1. Addressing Moral Hazard ............................................. 150
2. Addressing Adverse Selection ............................................ 152
C. Lawsuits Over Venture Capital Contracts ............................. 153
D. The "Gambler's Mentality" in Venture Capital Contracts ........ 155
IV. VENTURE CAPITALIST REPUTATION IN
THE INFORMATION AGE ...................................................... 156
A. The Market for Venture Capitalist Reputation ....................... 158
Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark Col-
lege. Thanks to Bernard Black, Steve Choi, Ron Gilson and Curtis Milhaupt for help-
ful comments and encouragement. Ken Piumarta provided excellent research assis-
tance and useful comments.
134 THEJOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW
B. Venture Capital on the Web ................................................ 162
1. General Information .................................................... 163
2. Venture Capital Firms .................................................. 164
3. News Publications ....................................................... 165
C. The Future of Venture Capital Contracting ........................... 170
V. CO N CLU SIO N .......................................................................... 174
A PPEN D IX ................................................................................. 175
I. INTRODUCTION
Money is the primary product offering of venture capitalists. Money
is a commodity. In an effort to distinguish themselves, most venture
capitalists provide services to their portfolio companies beyond capital
investment. These "value-added" services include "identifying and
evaluating business opportunities, including management, entry, or
growth strategies; negotiating and closing the investment; tracking and
coaching the company; providing technical and management assistance;
and attracting additional capital, directors, management, suppliers, and
other key stakeholders and resources."' Although these services form an
important part of the bargain between the venture capitalists and the en-
trepreneur, they are rarely specified-or even capable of specification-
in venture capital contracts. This Article examines the risks facing entre-
preneurs who "hire" venture capitalists to provide value-added services
and considers whether technology-specifically, the World Wide Web
(the Web)-will change the relationship between venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs with respect to such services.
Entrepreneurs face three risks in their quest to obtain value-added
services from venture capitalists. First, venture capitalists sometimes
promise to perform value-added services but simply fail to follow
through. This is the problem of "shirking," which does not appear to be
significant in the venture capital community. Second, venture capitalists
sometimes promise to perform value-added services but later attempt to
renegotiate this promise at a stage in the company's development when
' The level of venture capitalist involvement varies dramatically among invest-
ments. Ian C. MacMillan, David M. Kulow and Roubina Khoylian place venture capi-
talists along a spectrum ranging from "laissez faire" to "close trackers." Ian C. Mac-
Millan et al., Venture Capitalists'Involvement in Their Investments: Extent and Performance,
4J. Bus. VENTURING 27, 27 (1989).
WILUAM D. BYGRAVE & JEFFRYA. TIMMONS, VENTURE CAPITAL AT THE CROSSROADS
13 (1992). Whether these services actually add value and the extent of any added
value have been a matter of debate in the economics literature. See, e.g., HarryJ. Sa-
pienza, When Do Venture Capitalists Add Value?, 7J. Bus. VENTURING 9, 10-12 (1992).
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the entrepreneur has reduced bargaining power.' This is the problem of
"opportunism,"4 and it may be significant in the venture capital commu
nity. Third, venture capitalists sometimes promise to perform value-
added services but fail to perform up to the entrepreneur's standards.
This is the problem of "incompetence," and it may be significant in the
venture capital community.
All of these problems can be addressed, to some extent, through
appropriate provisions in the venture capital contracts. Shirking and op-
portunism are both incentive problems that can be mitigated by provid-
ing venture capitalists with proper incentives to act on behalf of the en-
trepreneur. Most venture capital contracts address shirking and
opportunism by providing ample incentives for the venture capitalist to
maximize the value of the entrepreneur's company. Nevertheless, those
contracts sometimes allow venture capitalists to benefit by acting in an
opportunistic fashion.
Incompetence is rarely addressed by the explicit terms of venture
capital contracts. Unlike shirking and opportunism, incompetence can-
not be cured by providing proper incentives and is best avoided at the
relationship's outset. If evidence of incompetence surfaces only after the
parties have entered a contractual relationship, the costs it imposes on
the entrepreneur can be mitigated only by terminating the venture capi-
talist's services. Most venture capital contracts do not provide the most
obvious method of terminating a venture capitalist's relationship with a
firm-the power of discretionary stock redemption.
The failure to fully address opportunism and incompetence through
the explicit terms of venture capital contracts may be intentional: entre-
preneurs may agree to assume the risk of opportunism and incompe-
tence in exchange for a reduced cost of capital. Entrepreneurs can miti-
gate some of the risk by relying on reputation as a nonlegal sanction (in
the case of opportunism) or as a sorting device (in the case of incompe-
tence). Whether reputation can function effectively as a nonlegal sanc-
tion or as a sorting device depends on the efficiency of the market for
reputation. Most venture capital scholars assume, either without reflec-
tion or using casual empiricism as their research methodology, that the
market for reputation among venture capitalists is highly efficient.5 This
Article does not directly address the latent empirical question, but offers
several reasons to doubt both the informational and fundamental effi-
ciency of the market for reputation,6 suggesting that entrepreneurs do
3 See Bernard Black & RonaldJ. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks versus Stock Markets, 47J. FIN. ECON. 243(1998).
' The definition of opportunism is far from fixed. The most commonly cited
definition is Oliver Williamson's: opportunism is "self-interest seeking with guile."
OtVER E. WILLtAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPrrALiSM 47 (1985).
See infra text accompanying notes 67, 110.
6 The terms "informational efficiency" and "fundamental efficiency" are bor-
rowed from the economics literature relating to the efficient capital markets hy-
1998]
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not necessarily have timely access to accurate information about venture
capitalists.
The focus of this Forum-the influence of technology in the devel-
opment of finance-provokes consideration of the manner in which
technology might assist entrepreneurs, assuming that they are subject to
informational deficiencies. The Web is the most powerful information
tool ever devised by humans, and information regarding venture capital-
ists is plentiful on the Web. The thesis of this Article is that the ready
availability of information on the Web will improve the efficiency of the
market for venture capitalist reputation, thus reducing agency costs for
entrepreneurs and ultimately resulting in contractual innovations.
Part II describes the nature of agency costs in the venture capital re-
lationship, with particular reference to shirking, opportunism, and in-
competence. Part III describes how those agency costs are sometimes
mitigated through appropriate contract provisions, but concludes that
the explicit terms of venture capital contracts fall short of fully protect-
ing most entrepreneurs. Part IV describes the market for venture capital-
ist reputation and speculates about the effect of the Web on the availabil-
ity of information in venture capital contracting process.
II. AGENCY COSTS IN VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING
The venture capital process may be conveniently divided into three
stages: fundraising, investing, and exiting. At each of these stages, two
relationships exert powerful, often countervailing, pressure on the par-
ties: the relationship between investors and venture capitalists, and the
relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Although
the focus of this Article is the relationship between venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs at the investing stage, the relationship between inves-
tors and venture capitalists influences the terms of the former relation-
ship in significant ways.
Most academic writings on the relationship between venture capital-
ists and entrepreneurs rely on a principal-agent model under which the
venture capitalists are principals and the entrepreneurs are agents. Un-
der this view, the primary purpose of any contract between the two par-
ties is "to align entrepreneurs' incentives with venture capitalists' goals."'
Less commonly addressed are issues raised by viewing entrepreneurs as
pothesis. In that context, informational efficiency implies that capital markets proc-
ess information quickly, almost instantaneously, so that no one may use the informa-
tion to make excess profits. Fundamental efficiency implies that the capital markets
process information accurately, so that prices reflect rational expectations about the
future value of securities. For a more complete description of these terms with ample
references to other sources, see Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disa-
greement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 646-50 (1995).
7 Paul A. Gompers, An Examination of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital
Investments (Apr. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter
Gompers, Convertible Securities].
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principals and venture capitalists as agents." This omission leads to an
incomplete understanding of venture capital contracting.
A. Principal-Agent Theoy in Venture Capital Investing
The expansive literature on the theory of the firm relies heavily on a
model of the firm in which investors contribute money and managers
contribute services.9 In this model, the investors are viewed as principals
and the managers as agents in an agency relationship. That relationship
is created by "a contract under which one or more persons (the princi-
pal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority
to the agent." 0
This delegation of authority is the key attribute of the principal-
agent relationship. The discretion that necessarily results from this dele-
gation creates the possibility that the agent will act in a manner contrary
to the best interests of the principal. The principal faces two distinct
risks: (1) the risk, known as moral hazard, that the agent will intention-
ally act in a self-interested manner and contrary to the best interests of
the principal" and (2) the risk, known as adverse selection, that the
agent will be incapable of acting in the principal's best interests because
of the agent's incompetence. Moral hazard and adverse selection en-
courage principals and agents to establish control mechanisms to miti-
gate the costs associated with these risks.
The moral hazard problem is addressed by providing the agent with
the proper incentives to act in the best interests of the principal. Con-
tracts may include both monitoring and bonding mechanisms to align
But see Manuel A. Utset, Innovation & Governance: High-Powered Incentives,
Opportunism, and Venture Capital Contracts (Feb. 24, 1997) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
" See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
'o Id. at 308.
" As prelude to their classic article on the theory of the firm, Jensen and Meck-
ling quote Adam Smith's masterful description of moral hazard:
The directors of such Uoint-stock] companies, however, being the managers
rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected,
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stew-
ards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for
their master's honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from hav-
ing it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in
the management of the affairs of such a company.
Id. at 305 (quoting ADAM SMrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 700 (1776)).
2 As used here, the term "incompetence" is not necessarily derogatory. It refers
only to the lack of adequate skill necessary to perform the assigned task and does not
imply that the agent is incapable of performing any tasks at a high level of skill. For
example, a venture capitalist may be highly competent to advise companies produc-
ing computer software but incompetent in the field of medical devices.
1998]
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the agent's interests with the principal's interests.' Despite the princi-
pal's best efforts to provide the agent with proper incentives, the agent's
actions will inevitably deviate from the best interests of the principal in
some ways. Some of these deviations may be intentional, the result of
moral hazard that has been inadequately addressed by the incentive
scheme. Other deviations may be the result of the agent's incompetence,
the agent's inherent inability to perform up to the principal's expecta-
tions. This is an adverse selection problem. The risk of loss to the princi-
pal from adverse selection cannot be mitigated by adjusting the agent's
incentive structure. The principal can address the adverse selection
problem either ex ante by improving the selection process or ex post by
replacing the incompetent agent with a competent agent. The costs as-
sociated with providing proper incentives, including both monitoring
and bonding costs, together with all residual costs incurred by the prin-
cipal because of the agent's suboptimal behavior-whether caused by
moral hazard or adverse selection-are the agency costs of-the relation-
ship.
B. Venture Capital Investing as a Cooperative Relationship
Most recent scholarship analyzing venture capital contracting im-
plicitly employs a "pure agency relationship" between venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs as the model. 14 For example, in what is perhaps the
most-cited economics article on venture capital, William Sahlman de-
scribes the contracts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs as
mechanisms for minimizin potential agency costs by vesting control
rights in venture capitalists. Most subsequent scholarship has followed
Sahlman's lead, viewing venture capital contracts exclusively as mecha-
nisms for reducing potential agency costs to venture capitalists.
6
Is Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 308.
Id. at 309. Jensen and Meckling contrast the "pure agency relationship" with a
"cooperative" relationship. Although they acknowledge the role of agency costs in
cooperative relationships "even though there is no clear cut principal-agent relation-
ship," id. at 309, they confine their paper "to only a small part of this general prob-
lem-the analysis of agency costs generated by the contractual arrangements be-
tween the owners and top management of the corporation." Id.
" William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organiza-
tions, 27J. FIN. ECON. 473, 506-14 (1990).
'6 See, e.g., Gompers, Convertible Securities, supra note 7; Paul A. Gompers, Op-
timal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capita4 50 J. FIN. 1461 (1995)
[hereinafter Gompers, Optional Investment] (arguing that staged capital investments
minimize agency costs). Reduction of agency costs also may be important in aspects
of venture capital investing beyond the contract between the venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs. For example, Josh Lerner argues that syndication of venture capital
investments "may lead to a superior selection of investments." Joshua Lerner, The
Syndication of Venture Capital Investments, 23 FIN. MGMT. 16, 17 (1994). In short, syndi-
cation may address the adverse selection problem.
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In a pure agency relationship-the usual example here is the rela-
tionship between shareholders and managers in a publicly traded corpo-
ration' -the agent does not face the same risks as the principal because
the principal's only obligation is to pay money, an act that is accom-
plished at the agency relationship's inception and thus not subject to
opportunistic behavior or dependent on the competence of the princi-
pal. The relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs is
not a pure agency relationship, but rather a more complex interaction
characterized by give-and-take on both sides. It might be viewed as a rela-
tionship with reciprocal agency obligations and thus be more akin to a
partnership than to the shareholders-manager relationship in a modem
public corporation."' For purposes of this Article, this relationship will be
referred to as a "cooperative relationship." 9
At the outset of the relationship, venture capitalists and entrepre-
neurs typically have a common goal: build the company to the point
where its stock may be sold to the public. Returns to venture capitalists
from initial public offerings (IPOs) far outdistance returns from other
exit options, including acquisitions, share repurchases by the company,
secondary sales, and liquidations.20 Reaching the IPO stage usually re-
quires more than money from the venture capitalists; it requires substan-
tial nonfinancial contributions to the firm. The following description
written by venture capitalists suggests the extent of potential nonfinan-
cial contributions:
[L]eading venture capitalists now typically have multi-
disciplined external contact networks or sometimes professional
staff that can provide portfolio companies with technical and
marketing guidance; assist in strategy, financing and recruiting
issues; and provide contacts with key potential customers, ven-
dors and financial institutions. Venture capitalists with invest-
ment banking capabilities can assist companies directly with pri-
vate or public equity financings, secured asset financing, joint
ventures or acquisitions. When appropriate, a venture capitalist
can assist a young company to ally with a larger established cor-
porate partner through technology exchanges, OEM or other
customer agreements, and minority equity investments. These
services, combined with direct involvement by venture capital-
17 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 309.
"' Jensen and Meckling note that "the relationship between the stockholders
and manager of a corporation fit[s] the definition of a pure agency relationship." Id.
" This terminology is common in the economics literature. See id. Alchian and
Demsetz use the similar concept of "team production" to describe production with
the following attributes: (1) several types of resources are used, (2) the product is
not the sum of separate outputs of each cooperating resource, and (3) not all re-
sources used in team production belong to one person. Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
777, 779 (1972).
'" See Bygrave & Timmons, supra note 2, at 167-83 (discussing IPOs, or "The
Golden Harvest").
19981
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ists in portfolio companies, such as serving on the board of di-
rectors, typically result in leading venture capital firms making
substantial investments in experienced personnel to help make
investments successful. 1
Michael Gorman and William Sahlman surveyed venture capitalists
and found that, although a venture capitalist is rarely involved in the
daily management of its portfolio companies, it performs many services
in addition to providing money.2 The most important of these nonfi-
nancial contributions were the following: (1) assisting the firm in obtain-
ing additional financing, (2) strategic planning, and (3) recruiting addi-
tional members of the management team. In a survey of venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs, Harry Sapienza found evidence to suggest
that value-added services were most important to highly innovative
firms.24
Focusing on the nonfinancial contributions of venture capitalists
places venture capital contracting in a new light. Instead of viewing ven-
ture capital contracts exclusively as mechanisms for reducing potential
agency costs to venture capitalists, this analysis suggests that they might
also serve as mechanisms for reducing the potential agency costs to the
entrepreneur. This view invites analysis of the potential moral hazard
and adverse selection problems facing the entrepreneur as principal in a
relationship in which the venture capitalist is also an agent. Each of
these problems is discussed in turn below.
C. The Entrepreneur's Moral Hazard Problem
Bengt Holmstr6m has described the moral hazard problem as "an
asymmetry of information among individuals that results because indi-
2 Daniel H. Case III & Standish H. O'Grady, An Overview of Venture Capital, in
START-UP COMPANIES: PLANNING, FINANCING AND OPERATING THE SUCCESSFUL BusINEss
§ 6.02[3] (Richard D. Harroch ed., 1996).
2 Michael Gorman & William A. Sahlman, Wat Do Venture Capitalists Do?, 4 J.
Bus. VENTURING 231 (1989). Venture capitalists perform more value-added services
than other private equity investors. Sanford B. Ehrlich et al., After the Cash Arrives: A
Comparative Study of Venture Capital and Private Investor Involvement in Entrepreneurial
Firms, 9J. Bus. VENTURING 67, 75-77 (1994).
2 Gorman & Sahlman, supra note 22, at 237. Harry Sapienza, Sophie Manigart,
and Wim Vermeir found that venture capitalists in four countries viewed strategic
assistance as their most valuable role, and interpersonal relations (as a mentor or
friend) as next in importance, followed by networking. HarryJ. Sapienza et al., Ven-
ture Capitalist Governance and Value Added in Four Countries, 11 J. Bus. VENTURING 439,
439-40 (1996). The most influential venture capitalists add value beyond these com-
pany-specific measures by creating networks of related companies. See Alex Gove,
American Keiretsu, RED HERRING, Feb. 1998, at 52 (describing the "keiretsu" of Inter-
net-product companies financed by Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers in Silicon Val-
ley); Zina Moukheiber, Kleiner's Web: Think of Kleiner Perkins as Bankers to the Net,
FORBES, Mar. 25, 1996, at 40.
2' Sapienza et al., supra note 23, at 20.
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vidual actions cannot be observed and hence contracted upon."2 When
information about an agent's actions is improved, principals are better
able to monitor agents and agents' incentives to perform improve. If the
parties do not provide for constraints on the agent's behavior, they open
the door to opportunism. As noted above, scholars have written exten-
sively about moral hazard from the standpoint of venture capitalists, but
little from the standpoint of the entrepreneur.
Shirking is a common moral hazard problem in many agency rela-
tionships, but it does not appear to be a significant problem in venture
capital relationships, for reasons explained below. The most prominent
risk to entrepreneurs is opportunism. 6 In this context, the potential for
opportunism arises from the possibility that the venture capitalist will at-
tempt to renegotiate with the entrepreneur at a point in the relationship
when the entrepreneur has diminished bargaining power.
Venture capitalists exert substantial control over the entrepreneur
because of the staged financing that characterizes most venture capital
relationships. Venture capitalists usually provide money to entrepre-
neurs in stages to give entrepreneurs an incentive to advance the com-
pany. At each stage, venture capitalists typically have preemptive rights to
participate by purchasing sufficient new shares to retain their ownership
interests in the company.2' But venture capitalists are not required to
provide financing at any stage in the process. Moreover, the refusal by
one venture capitalist to provide subsequent financing may be viewed as
a signal to other venture capitalists that the company is unworthy of capi-
tal. This combination of rights and incentives opens the door to ven-
ture capitalist opportunism.
Opportunism may take several forms. For example, venture capital-
ists may attempt to renegotiate the entrepreneur's employment contract
to force the entrepreneur from the business. The power to fire entre-
preneurs in their roles as officers of the companies they founded is often
granted by the explicit terms of venture capital contracts and when
combined with the commonly awarded right to buy out the shares
owned by the entrepreneurs, it allows venture capitalists to force entre-
preneurs completely out of the business.30 Thomas Hellman has argued
that entrepreneurs open themselves to this type of action to lower the
cost of capital.' In this negotiated context, the entrepreneur's termina-
Bengt Holmstr6m, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74
(1979).
26 See supra note 4 (defining opportunism).
" See Sahlman, supra note 15, at 505.
2 Id.
Id. at 507.
Venture capitalists usually have the right to repurchase shares at book value
from managers who have been dismissed. See Sahlman, supra note 15, at 507.
" Thomas Hellman, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Con-
tracts (Nov. 19, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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tion is not properly viewed as opportunistic because it is part of the bar-
gain. When an entrepreneur is terminated opportunistically, however,
the entrepreneur does not obtain the benefit of reduced capital costs.
Bernard Black and Ronald Gilson suggest that reputation is a check
against this sort of opportunism.32 Manuel Utset is unconvinced, arguing
that overly optimistic entrepreneurs will not be dissuaded from dealing
with a venture capitalist on these grounds.33
Another form of opportunism relates to the decision to sell the
company. Venture capitalists typically strive to preserve a menu of poten-
tial exit strategies. Although power to determine the firm's fate is con-
strained by contract, venture capitalists (as a result of staged financing)
often have substantial control over the timing of various exit strategies
and may make decisions contrary to the entrepreneur's interests. For ex-
ample, Paul Gompers has explored the phenomenon known as
"grandstanding," whereby a venture capitalist elects to Rursue a prema-
ture IPO in the hopes of enhancing its own reputation. Similarly, com-
panies known as the living dead -- firms that are profitable, but not so
profitable as to be candidates for IPOs-are routinely liquidated by ven-
ture capitalists hoping to turn to more promising ventures.36 Christopher
Barry describes the problem as follows:
The entrepreneur brings in the venture capitalist as a financial
partner and consultant. The venture capitalist may have incen-
tives to offer bad consulting advice to the entrepreneur, i.e., ad-
vice that suggests a course of action contrary to the interests of
the entrepreneur, up to and including the abandonment of an
investment that has economic value.... Premature abandon-
ment may come about because the venture capitalist has a di-
versified portfolio of opportunities and a high opportunity cost
of time, whereas the entrepreneur is fully committed to the ven-
ture and in fact may choose to overinvest other people's
37
money.
These forms of opportunism are possible under most venture capital
contracts, and the only apparent check on such behavior is the venture
capitalists' fear of reputational backlash.
" Black & Gilson, supra note 3, at 254.
" See Utset, supra note 8, at 28 n.93.
34 Paul A. Gompers, Grandstanding in the venture capital industry, 42 J. FIN. ECON.
133 (1996) [hereinafter Gompers, Grandstanding].
See John C. Ruhnka et al., The "Living Dead" Phenomenon in Venture Capital In-
vestments, 7J. Bus. VENTURING 137, 137-38 (1992).
w See id. at 147-48 (stating that "the most-often-used strategy (used in more than
75% of living dead situations) was an attempt to sell or merge the company-
typically to a larger company with a related product line or technology").
17 Christopher B. Barry, New Directions in Research on Venture Capital Finance, 23
FIN. MGMT. 3, 7-8 (Autumn 1994).
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D. The Entrepreneur's Adverse Selection Problem
The entrepreneur's adverse selection problem is less complex than
the multifaceted moral hazard problem just described. Paul Milgrom
and John Roberts define adverse selection as:
the kind of precontractual opportunism that arises when one party
to a bargain has private information about... something that
affects the other's net benefit from the contract and when only
those whose private information implies that the contract will
be especially disadvantageous for the other party agree to a con-
tract.
Adverse selection has the potential to produce the well-known
"market for lemons" 9 because a principal who cannot distinguish good
products from bad products will discount the price they are willing to
pay for all products (paying equally for both), causing sellers of bad
products to flood the market and sellers of good products to exit.
One method of mitigating the costs of adverse selection is to im-
prove the quality of information at the contracting stage, enabling the
buyer to better distinguish among the relative quality levels of available
products. For example, in a market for products (such as used cars),
brand names provide reputational signals of quality. In addition, con-
tractual innovations may serve to protect buyers from the costs of adverse
selection. For example, warrantees ensure that products meet certain
quality standards.4
Most venture capitalists rely heavily on reputation ("brand name")
to assure entrepreneurs regarding the quality of future services they are
"purchasing." If the entrepreneur nevertheless chooses poorly, the costs
of adverse selection accumulate over time because the relationship is
ongoing. The only method of abating such cumulating costs is to allow
the entrepreneur to end the relationship. This is the venture capital ana-
log to a warranty. From the entrepreneur's perspective, the adverse se-
lection problem in a venture capital relationship centers around the ven-
ture capitalist's competence at providing nonfinancial contributions to
the firm. As noted above, no amount of monitoring by the entrepreneur
will correct for venture capitalist incompetence, and once incompetence
is revealed, the only solution is to replace the venture capitalist.
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT
595 (1992).
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
'0 Id. at 489.
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III. MITIGATING AGENCY COSTS THROUGH VENTURE CAPITAL
CONTRACTS
When venture capitalists invest in a company, the transaction is typi-
cally accomplished through a set of contracts, including a stock purchase
agreement, a certificate of designations (or restated certificate of incor-
poration), a shareholders agreement, and a registration rights agree-
ment (collectively referred to as "venture capital contracts"). The ven-
ture capital contracts describe in great detail the relationship between
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, because these con-
tracts are not publicly available, analysis of the terms typically used in
venture capital contracts usually rests on a description of such contracts
in secondary sources. The first subpart below relies on Mark Suchman's
pathbreaking study of venture capital in Silicon Valley to describe vari-
ous contractual forms used in venture capital financing. The second
subpart then discusses common terms in venture capital contracts that
have the potential to address the moral hazard and adverse selection
problems of the entrepreneur and concludes that the explicit terms of
most venture capital contracts do not adequately protect entrepreneurs.
Beyond these explicit contractual protections, it is conceivable that
courts could impose extra-contractual duties on venture capitalists to
constrain agency costs. Although reported cases involving disputes be-
tween venture capitalists and entrepreneurs are relatively rare, the third
subpart below describes two recent cases that illustrate the approach that
most courts could be expected to take in response to such claims. In
short, courts are unlikely to be inclined to impose extra-contractual du-
ties on venture capitalists. The common law, therefore, does not address
the entrepreneur's moral hazard and adverse selection problems.
If the explicit terms of venture capital contracts and the common
law do not protect entrepreneurs against the problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection, why are entrepreneurs so willing to enter venture
capital relationships? The fourth subpart below considers the "gambler's
mentality" as a possible explanation. Although this theory might explain
some venture capital transactions, it is imprudent to assume such ram-
pant irrationality among entrepreneurs. A more likely answer to the
question-and one less derogatory toward entrepreneurs-is that entre-
preneurs rely on the market for reputation to select and monitor ven-
ture capitalists. This explanation is explored in Part III.
A. Forms of Venture Capital Contracts
As noted above, venture capital contracts are private documents.
Scholars examining venture capital contracting, therefore, often rely on
See, e.g., Michael J. Halloran et al., Making Portfolio Company Investments, in
VENTURE CAPITAL AND PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 6-1 (Lee F. Benton et al. section
eds., 1998).
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a few stylized descriptions of the terms of venture capital contracts as the
starting point for analysis. The most often-cited description of venture
capital contracts was written by William Sahlman, who studied approxi-
mately forty stock purchase agreements and found them "similar in
many ways. "12 Sahlman's search for commonality among the agreements
he studied was part of his attempt to demonstrate that venture capital
4.
contracts shift risk from the venture capitalists to the entrepreneur.
Sahlman's characterization of the venture capital relationship has ex-
erted tremendous influence on subsequent scholars.4
The tendency of scholars to rely on stylized descriptions of venture
capital contracts is understandable as part of an effort to make meaning-
ful generalizations about the nature of venture capital investing. Indeed,
this effort has produced many useful insights about venture capital in-
vesting, at least insofar as that investing conforms to the stylized con-
tracts being analyzed. Nevertheless, generalization has obscured an im-
portant fact about venture capital contracting: not all deals are alike.
Some entrepreneurs are powerful because they have demonstrated
their abilities to start and build successful companies. Other entrepre-
neurs, especially first-timers, have weak bargaining positions. Similarly,
some venture capitalists have established track records and a substantial
stable of portfolio companies, whereas other venture capitalists are
young and eager to fund companies with any reasonable prospect of hit-
ting a home run. It stands to reason that, in such a market, the contracts
would exhibit some variation.
In an important study of the impact of lawyers in Silicon Valley,
Mark Suchman attempted to describe such variation. 5 Suchman ana-
42 Sahlman, supra note 15, at 503.
' Id. at 510.
44 See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Robust Financial Contracting and the
Role of Venture Capitalists, 49J. FIN. 371, 374 (1994) (constructing a model that is con-
sistent with "the stylized facts about the venture capital industry" found in Sahlman's
article and elsewhere); Barry, supra note 37, at 8-9 (relying on Sahiman for descrip-
tion of venture capital contracts); Black & Gilson, supra note 3, at 250, 259 (citing
Sahlman and referring to provisions "typically" found in venture capital contracts);
Gompers, Convertible Securities, supra note 7, at 2 (stating that Sahlman "gives an
excellent summary of the common governance structures that typify the venture
capital industry"); Joshua Lerner, Venture capitalists and the decision to go public, 35 J.
FIN. 293, 294 (1994) (citing Sahlman for the proposition that "[v]enture [capitalists]
usually have several board seats and powerful control rights"). But see George W.
Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029,
1036 (1992) ("Although contracts are quite standardized in many areas, the varied
business contexts of venture capital discourage uniformity.").
', Mark C. Suchman, On Advice of Counsel: Law Firms and Venture Capital
Funds as Information Intermediaries in the Structuration of Silicon Valley (1994)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with the author).
Suchman's dissertation focuses on the role of lawyers in developing contractual
forms in Silicon Valley. Id. His work in this area continues to garner attention. See,
e.g., Ian Ayres, Never Confuse Efficiency With a Liver Complaint, 97 Wis. L. REv. 503, 508
(1997) (citing Suchman's methodology analysis with approval); Lisa Bernstein, The
19981
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lyzed seventy-eight "financing agreements" having some connection to
California. Using the technique of multi-dimensional scaling and data
derived from eleven types of contract provisions," Suchman found that
venture capital contracts tend to cluster into six distinctive
"neighborhoods."
The first neighborhood contains the "idiosyncratic contracts." These
contracts were idiosyncratic because they omitted terms common to
other contracts or contained nonstandard terms, "such as a dispropor-
tionate tendency to involve common-stock-only financings and a signifi-
candy elevated likelihood of including restrictions on the private trans-
fer of stock-ownership."49
The second neighborhood contains "weak contracts." These con-
tracts were "weakly-specified, short-term agreements, with only limited
protections for investors.... Investors benefit from relatively stringent
'cumulative' dividends, but they sacrifice items such as anti-dilution pro-
tections and rights of first refusal.""° These contracts frequently con-
tained discretionary stock redemption provisions, allowing successful en-
trepreneurs to repurchase the shares of venture capitalists at
predetermined prices, "usually at a premium over the initial investment
price but at a discount from the stock's market value. ""
The third neighborhood contains "pre-programmed contracts."
These contracts are "relatively conventional, but [they] exhibit a marked
preference for establishing a priori timetables, milestones and bench-
Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REv. 239, 241 (1995)
(discussing Suchman's analysis of Silicon Valley lawyers). Venture capital scholars,
however, have largely ignored the work.
4, Since the forms of documentation in venture capital financings can be idio-
syncratic, Suchman uses the term "financing agreements" generically to refer to all
of the contracts that comprise the relationship between venture capitalists and en-
trepreneurs, including stock purchase agreements, warrant agreements, registration
rights agreements, and the like. Suchman, supra note 45, at 238.
" Suchman says that multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) "examines a matrix of
'similarities' between data objects (contracts, in the present context), in order to cal-
culate a set of N-dimensional coordinates for each object." Id. at 191. By plotting
each data object according to its coordinates and then performing a regression
analysis, a researcher using MDS can reveal the fundamental dimensions and prox-
imities of the objects. Suchman employs a variation on traditional MDS called Indi-
vidual Differences Scaling (INDSCAL), which allows the researcher to input multiple
matrices of similarities, rather than just one. The result of his INDSCAL analysis is a
"map" of venture capital financing agreements. Id. at 191-93.
" The eleven groups were: (1) dividend provisions, (2) liquidation and merger
provisions, (3) stock redemption requirements, (4) mandatory conversion clauses,
(5) anti-dilution protections, (6) class-voting requirements, (7) affirmative and nega-
tive covenants, (8) representations and warranties, (9) financial reporting require-
ments, (10) sale restrictions and rights of first refusal, and (11) stock registration
rights. Id. at 194.
'9 Id. at 219.
ro Id.
,iI d.
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marks" relating to merger rights, anti-dilution rights, and redemption
rights.52 The common theme underlying these provisions is tight control
by the venture capitalist at the outset with the potential for loosening the
venture capitalist's grip if the company is successful. Suchman concludes
that these contracts "conjure an image of the venture capital relationship
as an 'indentured servitude'-a limited period of reduced autonomy,
during which the start-up faces various carefully-delineated opportunities
to earn its freedom from initially-burdensome obligations to its financial
backers."
5 3
The fourth neighborhood contains "legalistic contracts." These con-
tracts are legalistic because they contain expansive provisions detailing
the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. These
contracts guard the upside interests of the start-up through mandatory
conversion provisions, discretionary stock redemption clauses and com-
plexly contingent merger treatments; at the same time, these agree-
ments address the downside concerns of investors through cumulative
dividend provisions, abundant covenants, through representations and
warranties, and nearly-universal anti-dilution protection. Between these
performance extremes, [these contracts seem] to embrace a relatively
long-term view of the venture capital relationship, with virtually all
agreements granting rights of first refusal to investors who wish to join in
future financing rounds.54
The fifth neighborhood contains "close contracts." These contracts
are designed to forge long-term relationships between venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs, offering "few easy exits, eschewing discretionary
stock redemption and placing stringent conditions on investors' powers
to register their holdings for public sale." These contracts also erect
barriers to entry, including "harsh anti-dilution protections, nearly-
universal rights of first refusal, and numerous protective covenants.
'
Suchman suggests that the "overall image here is of a 'jealous mar-
riage'-a long-term, close and exclusive relationship structured so as to
forestall potential infidelities."57
The sixth neighborhood contains "flexible contracts." Like the idio-
syncratic contracts and weak contracts, these contracts frequently do not
specify certain common terms, but Suchman suggests that the omission
is an intentional effort to build "adaptive relationships."58 Unlike those
other contracts, these contain some fairly extensive provisions-
numerous representations, warranties, and covenants; financial report-
ing obligations; rights of first refusal; and stock registration rights-
52 Id.
3 Id.
Id. at 219-20.
Id. at 220.
Id.
5 Id.
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suggesting that the parties were willing and able to specify their respec-
tive obligations in contracts, but chose to leave many details out.
Suchman's typology of venture capital financing agreements pro-
vides a richer and more realistic account of the relationship between
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs than normally appears in the aca-
demic literature on venture capital. Certain of the contract forms men-
tioned above might fit easily into the stylized facts employed by scholars.
For example, Suchman suggests that pre-programmed contracts adhere
closely to entrepreneurs' descriptions of "vulture capital" and that close
contracts comport with William Bygrave and Jeffry Timmons' conception
of classic venture capital. 60 Nevertheless, Suchman's analysis powerfully
demonstrates that no set of stylized facts attempting to pigeonhole all
venture capital contracts into a single contract form is sufficient.
Suchman's typology also suggests that venture capital contracts are
more balanced than traditionally perceived. The traditional view is ex-
emplified by William Sahlman, who identified four ways in which ven-
ture capital contracts addressed moral hazard and adverse selection
problems facing venture capitalists. First, the structure of venture capital
investments, particularly the staging of such investments, provides per-
formance incentives to entrepreneurs and allows venture capitalists to
abandon- investments that are failing.6' Second, compensation schemes
involving lower-than-market cash salaries combined with substantial
common stock and stock options, which are subject to vesting schedules
and repurchase rights, provide strong incentives for entrepreneurs to
perform.6r Third, venture capitalist involvement in managing the firm
serves a monitoring function and ensures that performance (at least in
those areas in which the venture capitalist is active) meets with the ven-
ture capitalist's expectations. 63 Fourth, the use of convertible securities
allows a venture capitalist to salvage some value from failing ventures
and usually specifies that the venture capitalist may sell its shares at the
same time and on the same terms as the entrepreneurs.64 Each of these
aspects of the venture capital relationship mitigates agency costs to the
venture capitalists.
In summarizing the effects of the contract on the relationship be-
tween venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, Sahlman emphasized the
benefits to venture capitalists: "A key feature of the contracts and operat-
ing procedures is that risk is shifted from the venture capitalists to the
entrepreneur[s].... It would be foolish for the entrepreneur[s] to ac-
r Id.
CO Id. at 222.
SahIman, supra note 15, at 506-07.
2 Id. at 508.
Id. at 508-09.
Id. at 509.
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cept such contract terms if they were not trul, confident of their own
abilities and deeply committed to the venture."
Of course, it would be equally foolish for the entrepreneur to enter
into such a contract without some assurance regarding the venture capi-
talist's commitment. As Sahlman observes, the cost of venture capital is
high and cannot be justified by the money alone.66 Sahlman suggests that
the primary brake on venture capitalist opportunism is fear of dimin-
ishment of reputational capital:
Although it seems that venture capitalists retain much of the
power in the relationship with entrepreneurial ventures, there
are checks and balances in the system. Venture capitalists who
abuse their power will find it hard to attract the best entrepre-
neurs, who have the option of approaching other venture capi-
talists or sources other than venture capital. In this regard, the
decision to accept money from a venture capitalist can be seen
as a conscious present-value-maximizing choice by the entre-
67preneur.
While Sahlman's account of venture capital contracts portrays a lop-
sided agreement favoring venture capitalists-thus enabling venture
capitalists to act opportunistically-Suchman concludes that each con-
tract form provides benefits to and places burdens on both sides of the
deal. On this point Suchman argues:
Although the trade press often frames discussions of venture
capital transactions as debates between pro-company positions
and pro-investor alternatives, the configuration of actual Silicon
Valley financings displays little evidence of this distinction. Ad-
mittedly, individual contractual provisions often benefit one
side at the expense of the other; however, such a provision-by-
provision analysis may miss the larger picture. Taken as a whole,
c" Id. at 510. Sahlman also notes that the collective weight of the contracts on
entrepreneurs assists in mitigating adverse selection: "[T]he entrepreneurs typically
hold undiversified portfolios. Much of their wealth is invested in securities of the
company they manage. The entrepreneur's willingness to bear diversifiable risk also
conveys useful information to the venture capitalists." Id. at 511.
' Id. at 512-13. One venture capitalist company addressed the valuation concern
on its Web site. Responding to one of the "Top Ten Myths About Venture Capital"
which read, "Venture capitalists give me a lower valuation than a private placement,"
the firm wrote:
Sometimes. Keep in mind that a venture capitalist-especially an early-stage in-
vestor like ATV-will spend a significant amount of time with entrepreneurs. We
participate in business planning, sales strategy, even key hiring decisions. In ad-
dition, we represent an important link to larger capital markets when the time
comes for additional venture investment, or for an IPO.
Participants in a private placement are usually individual investors, who tend to
be less involved. You may get a higher valuation for your shares today, but a ven-
ture investment can add far more value in the long run.
Alliance Technology Ventures, Top Ten Myths About Venture Capital (visited Mar. 21,
1998) <http://www.atv.com/links/library/topten.html>.
67 Sahlman, supra note 15, at 513.
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each of the contractual archetypes uncovered here appears to
conjoin countervailing sets of terms into a coherent, relatively
balanced bundle. Thus, "weak" contracts couple stringent divi-
dends with substantial operational autonomy and limited dura-
tion; "pre-programmed" contracts link burdensome initial obli-
gations with carefully specified release trajectories; "legalistic"
contracts mix upside assurances for founders with downside
guarantees for investors; "close" contracts pair bilateral barriers
to exit with bilateral barriers to entry; and "flexible" contracts
meld lax financial obligations with extensive assurances regard-
ing supervision rights, exit paths, and conflicting commitments.
None of this, of course, implies that individual contracts are
immune to the effects of bargaining power and negotiating
skill; however, these findings do suggest that the Silicon Valley
community's dominant contractual models reflect different ways
of reconciling competing interests, rather than total victories for
one side or the other.
Suchman's conclusion that venture capital agreements contain pro-
tective provisions favorable to both sides makes good sense, but may
overstate the case. It is not obvious, for example, how entrepreneurs en-
sure that venture capitalists actually provide nonfinancial support to the
enterprise because venture capital contracts rarely specify the nonfinan-
cial obligations of venture capitalists. The following subpart examines
this issue.
B. ProtectingEntrepreneurs Through Venture Capital Contracts
Venture capital contracts have the potential to protect entrepre-
neurs against both moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Never-
theless, most venture capital contracts fall far short of offering full pro-
tection; therefore, the analysis below suggests an important role for the
market for reputation, which is analyzed in more detail in Part IV.
1. Addressing Moral Hazard
The structure of most venture capital relationships provides power-
ful incentives to mitigate shirking by the venture capitalist. By using eq-
uity rather than debt and by restricting the payment of dividends, a ven-
ture capital contract often limits the ability of a venture capitalist to exit
without losing at least part of its investment. Collectively, various provi-
sions of the venture capital contracts provide strong incentives to ven-
ture capitalists to maximize the value of the firm.
In most venture capital transactions, venture capitalists purchase
preferred stock that does not require the company to pay cash dividends,
at least during the first years of the company's life. As explained by Mi-
chael Halloran, "corporations being financed with venture capital money
are rarely in a position to pay dividends to their venture capital investors.
' Suchman, supra note 45, at 223-24.
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As a result, most dividend provisions do not make dividends either man-
datory or cumulative."9 Such provisions reflect the fact that a venture
capitalist usually expects to earn its money through sale of the com-
pany-either through a public offering or an acquisition-rather than
through a fixed return. Viewed another way, restricting the payment of
dividends places added pressure on the venture capitalist to assist the
company in achieving success because, without a public offering or ac-
quisition, the venture capitalist is unlikely to profit from the investment.
Venture capitalists profit if the company executes a successful public
offering because almost every venture capital contract provides for con-
version of the preferred stock into common stock upon the completion
of a public offering meeting certain requirements. The venture capital-
ists, therefore, will hold shares of common stock that likely have a sub-
stantially higher value than the price paid by the venture capitalist." To
ensure that the shares owned by the venture capitalist are liquid, most
venture capital agreements provide for registration rights. Demand reg-
istration rights, which allow the venture capitalists to determine the na-
ture and timing of registration, are rarely used, but venture capitalists
often receive "piggyback" registration rights, allowing them to register
their shares at the same time as the company.2 Registration is a precur-
sor to a public sale of securities and is a sign of success. Granting venture
capitalists registration rights, therefore, provides venture capitalists with
the proper incentives to work on behalf of the company and thus miti-
gates the costs associated with shirking.73
If the company fails, the venture capitalist faces the prospect of re-
ceiving only a liquidation preference. Traditionally, liquidation prefer-
ences for the preferred stock were valued at the original issue prices, but
more recent contracts often allow the venture capitalists to participate
with the common stock in any gains.74 Nevertheless, liquidation is clearly
a less desirable exit option than the IPO.
Go Halloran et al., supra note 41, at 8-7 to 8-8.
Id. at 8-31.
" The venture capital contracts usually provide for a minimum price per share
as a conversion condition. Michael Halloran notes that "[tihe minimum price per
share represents an agreed-upon measure of success. If the Company's valuation
meets or exceeds that price per share, the venture capitalists are willing to give up
their seniority." Id.
7 Id. at 9-5; Sahlman, supra note 15, at 504.
Venture capitalists are likewise encouraged to prepare the company for sale,
usually as a second-best option to a public offering, by certain preferences granted in
the context of a merger, consolidation, or sale of all, or substantially all, of the cor-
poration's assets. See Halloran et al., supra note 41, at 8-15.
" The reason for this development is explained by Michael Halloran:
Previously, the various series of Preferred Stock were given a liquidation prefer-
ence over the Common Stock equal to the original issue prices (i.e., the per
share prices the investors paid). If the investors desired to participate in any gain
on their investment, they were compelled to convert their Preferred Stock into
Common Stock.
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These built-in incentives to avoid shirking seem to be effective be-
cause shirking is rarely cited as a concern in venture capital relation-
ships. But other forms of moral hazard-specifically, those associated
with opportunism-are not usually addressed by venture capital con-
tracts. Indeed, venture capital contracts often provide the mechanism
(staged financing) that allows for opportunism. Even though venture
capitalists often do not contract for outright control of a portfolio com-
pany, either through majority share ownership or control of the board of
directors, venture capitalists exert tremendous power over the entrepre-
neur because of staged financing. As noted by Paul Gompers, "The role
of staged capital infusion is analogous to that of debt in highly leveraged
transactions, keeping the owner/manager on a 'tight leash' and reduc-
ing potential losses from bad decisions.'
Entrepreneurs have no effective contractual counterweight to staged
financing. Even if they have nominal control of their company, challeng-
ing a venture capitalist will not only ensure that the entrepreneur does
not receive funding from that venture capitalist but may doom the en-
trepreneur with other venture capitalists. The fact that entrepreneurs
are willing to cede such power to venture capitalists suggests either thatare wlling 76
they are irrational or that they are protected by some mechanism be-
yond the explicit terms of the contract. The most likely source of such
extra-contractual protection is the market for reputation, which is dis-
cussed in Part IV.
2. Addressing Adverse Selection
The entrepreneur's only effective contractual protection against ad-
verse selection (which can be combated after entering a venture capital
contract only by terminating the relationship) is discretionary stock re-
demption. Discretionary stock redemption provisions allow entrepre-
neurs to repurchase the stock sold to venture capitalists at a predeter-
mined price. Mark Suchman found that discretionary stock redemption
provisions were common in weak, pre-programmed, and legalistic con-
tracts, but they are not usually found in close or flexible contracts-the
most common modern forms of venture capital agreements." Indeed,
discretionary stock redemption provisions are sufficiently rare in mod-
em venture capital contracts that many venture capitalists claim never to
have seen them. 78
Basically, this system allocated all financial gain to the holders of Common Stock
until they "caught up" with the holders of Preferred Stock. The consideration
for this was their "sweat equity," the amount of time they worked for the corpo-
ration before they "earned" their shares under the typical vesting system.
Id. at 8-11.
71 See Gompers, Optional Investment, supra note 16, at 1462.
76 See infra Part III.D (discussing the "gambler's mentality").
7 See Suchman, supra note 45, at 219-20.
78 At a recent conference on venture capital in Portland, Oregon, Gerard H.
Langeler of Olympic Venture Partners observed: "You can divorce your spouse. You
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Even if a discretionary stock redemption provision was proposed,
venture capitalists would be unenthusiastic. Such provisions limit a ven-
ture capitalist's ability to decide the form of its investment. For exam-
ple, if a company were contemplating the exercise of a discretionary
right of redemption, it is safe to assume that the value of the company
had risen and the venture capitalist would convert preferred shares into
common shares to preserve an interest in the company.80 Although the
venture capitalist would remain interested in the company, many of the
control mechanisms previously awarded to the venture capitalist would
evaporate upon conversion.
The absence of discretionary stock redemption provisions from most
modem venture capital contracts suggests that the cost to the entrepre-
neur of protecting against adverse selection through contract are greater
than the risks. This in turn suggests that entrepreneurs have other
methods of protecting against adverse selection. The most likely candi-
date for such protection is the market for reputation, discussed in Part
IV.
C. Lawsuits Over Venture Capital Contracts
Conventional wisdom has it that lawsuits in the venture capital
community are rare.8 According to this view, entrepreneurs are loath to
sue their venture capitalists for fear of gaining a reputation for recalci-
trance and never receiving venture funding. On the other hand, venture
capitalists are reluctant to sue entrepreneurs because they fear acquiring
cannot divorce your investors." Gerald H. Langeler, Remarks at the Venture Oregon
'97 conference sponsored by Oregon Entrepreneurs Forum (Oct. 14, 1997).
7 Venture capitalists are more favorably disposed toward mandatory redemption
provisions, but even these are rare in venture capital agreements because the provi-
sions are "not viewed as a realistic alternative" for a company with little or no cash
inflow. See Halloran et al., supra note 41, at 8-16. For other arguments against manda-
tory redemption from the venture capitalist's view, see id. at 8-17.
' See id. at 8-17 (observing that "corporations prefer redemption provisions ex-
ercisable at their option so that they can force the Preferred Stock to convert into
Common Stock (and surrender its privileges) at some time in the future, even if the
conditions for automatic conversions are not met"). George W. Dent, Jr. states that:
It is misleading ... to assume that the investor gambles that the company's for-
tune will not improve, because if the company's fortune does improve, the inves-
tor's conversion right appreciates. Consequently, in venture capital deals, the
corporation's option to redeem works primarily to force an investor conversion
that will relieve the company of the burdens of interest (or dividend) payments
and restrictive covenants.
Dent, supra note 44, at 1063.
8, See, e.g., Jan Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 571 (1991) ("The sophisticated investors
in private placements (usually venture capitalists or established companies) do not
generally sue if things turn out badly, in the absence of strong evidence of common-
law fraud."); Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers
and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 679
(1996).
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a reputation for abusiveness that will drive away future entrepreneurs.
Regardless of whether conventional wisdom is correct,8 the general flow
of such cases should not provide much comfort to entrepreneurs be-
cause the courts typically treat these disputes as entirely contractual.
Venture capitalists do not owe any special fiduciary duties to entrepre-
neurs. Two recent cases decided by Chancellor Allen of the Delaware
Court of Chancery are illustrative.
In Orban v. Field," the founder (Orban) of Office Mart Holdings
Corp. sued the venture capitalists who had come to control the com-
pany.84 The source of the dispute was a stock-for-stock merger between
Office Mart and Staples, Inc. Under the terms of the merger agreement,
each class of Office Mart stock was required to approve the merger by a
ninety percent vote so that Staples could account for the merger as a
pooling of interests. Orban, Office Mart's largest holder of common
stock, opposed the merger because the common stockholders of Office
Mart were to receive no payment for their shares; the liquidation prefer-
ences of the preferred stockholders consumed the entire purchase price.
Although the holders of preferred stock owned sufficient shares of
common stock and warrants to control ninety percent of the vote, the
company needed to amend the certificate of incorporation (by increas-
ing the number of authorized shares) and take other actions (including
the non-pro-rata redemption of preferred shares to provide funds for the
exercise of the warrants) to facilitate the exercise of the warrants. As a
result of these actions, Orban's share of common stock was diluted below
ten percent, and all classes of stock of Office Mart approved the merger.
Orban claimed that the directors of Office Mart breached their fi-
duciary duties to the holders of Office Mart common stock by facilitating
the exercise of the warrants. Chancellor Allen held that the directors did
not breach a duty by honoring a contractual right of the preferred
stockholders, even if that right injured the common stockholders:
Whereas the preferred stockholders had existing legal prefer-
ences, the common stockholders had no legal right to a portion
of the merger consideration under Delaware law or the corpo-
82 It is far from obvious that the reputational constraints on venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs are much greater than other potential litigants in American soci-
ety. Perhaps the relatively modest appeal to litigation results from the moderating
role of venture capital lawyers. See generally Suchman & Cahill, supra note 81.
No. CIVA.12820, 1997 WL 153831 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997).
Of the five defendants, two were venture capitalists. William Field was the
Chairman of Prudential Equity Investments Corp., which is the corporate general
partner of Prudential Venture Partners II, and Jay McGoodwin was the Senior Vice
President of Security Pacific Venture Capital Group, which held shares of preferred
stock in Office Mart through First Small Business Investment Company. Id. at *7
n.19. One of the other defendants was Stephen T. Westerfield, an experienced retail
executive who replaced the founder of Office Mart as CEO. Id. at *2 n.3. The re-
maining two defendants were the two companies involved in the merger, Office Mart
and Staples. Ironically, the founder of the company describes himself as a "venture
capitalist." Id. at *2.
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rate charter. The Staples' transaction appeared reasonably to be
the best available transaction. Mr. Orban's threat to impede the
realization of that transaction by the corporation was thwarted
by legally permissible action that was measured and appropriate
in the circumstances.8
In Orban the contract favored the venture capitalists, but that is not
always the case. In Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams,s Chancellor Al-
len again addressed a breach of fiduciary duty claim in the context of a
venture capital contract. In Adams, however, the claim was made by the
venture capitalists, not the entrepreneur. The focus of attention in Ad-
ams was Genta Incorporated, a bio-pharmaceutical company that owned
several promising technologies but had never turned a profit. The com-
pany was running out of operating funds and sought new sources of
capital. The venture capitalists, who owned preferred stock with a liqui-
dation preference, wanted to liquidate the company. The entrepreneurs,
on the other hand, owned common stock, and wanted to continue the
business in the hope of someday obtaining a return. Because the terms
of the preferred stock did not provide for the right to force liquidation,
the holders of preferred stock were forced to argue that the directors
breached a fiduciary duty by pursuing additional financing. Chancellor
Allen rejected this claim:
While the board in these circumstances could have made a dif-
ferent business judgment, in my opinion, it violated no duty
owed to the preferred in not doing so. The special protections
offered to the preferred are contractual in nature. The corpora-
tion is, of course, required to respect those legal rights. But,
aside from the insolvency point just alluded to, generally it will
be the duty of the board, where discretionary judgment is to be
exercised, to prefer the interests of the common stock-as the
good faith judgment of the board sees them to be-to the in-
terests created by the special rights, -preferences, etc., of pre-
ferred stock, where there is a conflict.
The lesson of Orban and Adams is that courts are inclined to enforce
the bargain between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.88
D. The "Gamblers Mentality" in Venture Capital Contracts
The foregoing subparts have attempted to explain the structure of
venture capital contracting from the standpoint of a rational, value-
Id. at *9.
No. CIVA.15513, 1997 WL 225708 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1997).
'7 Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
See also Macksey v. Egan, 633 N.E.2d 408 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that
venture capitalists had exercised "best efforts" as required by contract); Capital In-
vestments, Inc. v. Whitehall Packing Co., Inc., 280 N.W.2d 254 (Wis. 1979) (holding
that an ambiguous financing agreement would be construed against the venture
capitalists who drafted it).
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maximizing entrepreneur. Another view of venture capital financing is
that entrepreneurs are not rational, but are overly optimistic. Joseph
Bankman, in attempting to explain the failure of Silicon Valley startups
to maximize tax benefits through organizational structure, considered
the possibility that investors and venture capitalists did not concern
themselves with foregone tax benefits because they had a "gambler's
mentality. "" In other words, they expected the success of every new ven-
ture to dwarf any adverse tax consequences, so they simply did not con-
cern themselves with the issues.
This view does not carry much water for the particular problem
raised by Bankman, but it may offer some guidance to the current
problem. Manuel Utset, for example, relies heavily on this view of entre-
preneurs as overly optimistic to explain supposed shortfalls in venture
capital contracts. Even if this sort of irrationality can explain some ven-
ture capital contracts, however, it seems unlikely to explain the fact that
almost all venture capital contracts fall short of fully protecting the en-
trepreneur. Jokes regarding engineers notwithstanding,2 the idea that
entrepreneurs would consistently enter contracts that are facially so lop-
sided strains credulity.
A more plausible account of venture capital contracts is offered by
the theory that the market for reputation among venture capitalists pro-
vides protection to entrepreneurs beyond the explicit terms of the con-
tracts. That theory is examined in more detail in the next Part.
IV. VENTURE CAPITALIST REPUTATION IN THE INFORMATION
AGE
The Web will change the world. One commentator recently wrote
that:
[T]he transformations brought forth by the technology industry
over the past 20 years, exemplified by the invention of the mi-
croprocessor, the advent of the personal computer, the rise of
Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Stat-ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737,
1764-65 (1994).
® Bankman writes:
The difficulty with the explanation lies in the assumption that maximizing tax
benefits is inconsistent with a preference for high-risk, high-return invest-
ments.... [A] given limited partnership investment fund may finance scores of
start-ups. Whatever their level of optimism, venture capitalists know, statistically,
that.., all of these start-ups will show early tax losses. All else equal, better utili-
zation of tax benefits should enable venture capitalists to increase their inves-
tors' after-tax return without increasing the level of risk. Alternatively, venture
capitalists could reduce the before-tax risk level (and hence return) of invest-
ments and use the additional (risk-free) tax benefits to produce a portfolio that
provides investors with their current after-tax return with less risk.
Id. at 1765.
9' See Utset, supra note 8, at 55-59.
See generally ScoTT ADAMs, TiH DILBERT PRINCIPLE (1996).
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Microsoft and fall of IBM, are mere gusts of wind compared to
the tornado, the hurricane, and the tsunami wave of the Inter-
93
net.
This view is widely held, but few people pretend to have a solid grasp
of how the world will change. Venture capital contracting has been in a
constant state of flux over the past four decades, and it seems likely that
it will not be immune from the effects of the Web. This final part of the
Article addresses the question: How (if at all) will the Web change ven-
ture capital contracting?
The answer to that question begins with an examination of the mar-
ket for reputation among venture capitalists. Moral hazard and adverse
selection are both caused by informational asymmetries between the en-
trepreneur and venture capitalist.9' Although these problems may be
mitigated to some extent by the venture capital contracts, those contracts
routinely fall short of fully protecting entrepreneurs. The market for
reputation can assist in filling the gap. For moral hazard, reputational
concerns provide incentives to venture capitalists to refrain from oppor-
tunistic behavior.95 With respect to adverse selection, on the other hand,
reputation is employed as a sorting device. 96
The market for reputation will perform its gap-filling function, how-
ever, only to the extent that it is informationally and fundamentally effi-
cient. In other words, it must provide information to entrepreneurs
quickly (informational efficiency) and accurately (fundamental effi-
ciency). The Web has the potential to make the market for reputation
more efficient.
' J. Neil Weintraut, Introduction, in ROBERT H. REID, ARCHITECTS OF THE WEB:
1,000 DAYs THAT BUILT THE FTrURE OF BusINiss xiii-iv (1997).
See supra Part II.C-D.
95 See infra Part VA.
Reputation is not the only nonlegal sanction that encourages performance of
the venture capital contracts. David Charny describes "relationship-specific prospec-
tive advantage" and "psychic and social goods" as other forms of nonlegal sanction.
David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373,
393 (1990). With respect to the former, Charny observes:
A particularly important and common form of relationship-specific prospective
advantage is the opportunity to deal again with the same transactor-the "repeat
deal." The asset posted is the value of future dealings; if one party breaches, the
other party will terminate the relationship and refuse to deal with the breacher
again, destroying the asset.
Id. Although the repeat deal may arise in a venture capital context, it appears to be
much less important in the venture capital community than in some other settings.
Likewise, "psychic and social goods"-such as "loss of opportunities for important or
pleasurable associations with others, loss of self-esteem, feelings of guilt, or an unful-
filled desire to think of himself as trustworthy and competent"-also may play some
role in the venture capital relationship. Id. at 393-94. Nevertheless, both of these
nonlegal sanctions seem less important than reputation and, therefore, will not be
analyzed in detail here.
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A. The Market for Venture Capitalist Reputation
A venture capitalist's ability to provide effective nonfinancial assis-
tance to its portfolio companies is highly dependent on its store of
"reputational capital."97 Indeed, several scholars have argued that only
the most prestigious venture capital firms truly add value to portfolio
companies.9 8 Bernard Black and Ronald Gilson describe the importance
of reputation as follows:
Talented managers are more likely to invest their human capi-
tal in a company financed by a respected venture capital fund,
because the venture capitalist's participation provides a credi-
ble signal about the company's likelihood of success. Suppliers
will be more willing to risk committing capacity and extending
trade credit to a company with respected venture capital back-
ers. Customers will take more seriously the company's promise
of future product delivery if a venture capitalist both vouches
for and monitors its management and technical process....
Later on, the venture capitalist's reputation helps to attract a
high quality underwriter for an initial public offering of the
portfolio company's stock (Lerner, 1994a:Megginson and
Weiss, 1991).9
The reputation of the venture capitalists probably matters most in
the most important area: going public. Empirical studies suggest that
firms backed by well-respected venture capitalists are able to sell shares
to the public at higher prices than other firms.'0
The argument that the market for reputation curbs opportunism
and incompetence relies on the assumption that the actions of venture
capitalists are observable to future entrepreneurs or those who counsel
future entrepreneurs regarding their choice of venture capitalists. In
short, the argument relies on the efficiency of the market for reputation.
Although the analogy to the efficient capital markets hypothesis might
easily be carried too far, it does not seem an exaggeration to state that
the market for reputation compiles information about venture capitalists
and summarizes that information in a measure called "reputation" in a
manner similar to that in which capital markets assemble information
about companies and summarize that information in a measure called
"price."'' Obviously, stock prices are more transparent than reputations,
'7 Black & Gilson, supra note 3, at 254.
'8 See, e.g.,Joseph Rosenstein et al., The CEO, Venture Capitalists and the Board, 8J.
Bus. VENTUING 99 (1993).
' Black & Gilson, supra note 3, at 254.
'0 Christopher B. Barry et al., The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public
Companies: Evidence From the Going Public Process, 27J. FIN. EcON. 447, 464 (1990); Wil-
liam L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public
Offerings, 46J. FIN. 879 (1991).
101 The fact that reputation is not quantified does not diminish the power of the
analogy-as far as it goes-because the end measure (whether it is reputation or
price) is not the inquiry's focus. Instead, the inquiry is designed to provide a coher-
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not only because stock prices are quantified but also because they are
displayed for all of the world to see in a single, centralized location
(either an exchange or, in the case of the over-the-counter market, a
computer screen). Still, the analogy is useful because it focuses attention
on the various components of the process by which reputations are
made. Indeed, in their influential work describing the mechanisms of
capital market efficiency, Ronald Gilson and Reineir Kraakman recog-
nized the aptness of the analogy between capital markets and other mar-
kets:
[T]he extent of informational efficiency is surely a central de-
terminant of the pricing behavior and institutional underpin-
nings of all markets, and not merely of the securities markets.
Our analysis, then, is only part of a broader inquiry into the
functioning of markets in general. That inquiry, stated generi-
cally, examines the joint interaction of product or service mar-
kets and the associated markets in information about the prod-
uct or service.'0
Following Gilson and Kraakman, a thorough understanding of ven-
ture capitalist reputation would require an examination of two markets:
the market for information about venture capitalists and the associated
market for venture capitalist reputation. The market for information
"determines how information is initially distributed,"'0 s while the market
for reputation determines "how (and how much) efficiency is achieved
given the initial distribution of information."' ° This Article will not fully
describe these two markets, but rather will sketch the outlines of those
markets as a means of defining a future role for the Web.
Unlike capital markets, reputational markets have rarely been the
subject of direct analysis.'05 One notable exception, because of its close
relationship to this Article, is Paul Gompers' work on grandstanding in
the venture capital industry.' ° Gompers argues convincingly that "young
venture capital firms have incentives to grandstand, i.e., they take actions
that signal their ability to potential investors. Specifically, young venture
ent theory of the process by which information is reflected in a summary measure.
The fact that one summary measure is stated in terms of dollars and another is un-
quantified should not obscure the fact that each must be generated by a similar
process.
"2 RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REv. 549, 643 (1984).
303 Id. at 593.
104 Id.
'0' This is the most obvious difference in the academic literature between mar-
kets for reputation and capital markets. While capital markets have been the object
of numerous empirical and theoretical studies, markets for reputation are rarely
studied in any fashion. But see Charny, supra note 96 (discussing nonlegal sanctions,
including reputation, that assist in the enforcement of commercial transactions);
Louis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26J.L. & EcoN. 691
(1983) (analyzing reputational markets via contract).
,06 See Gompers, Grandstanding, supra note 34.
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capital firms bring companies public earlier than older venture capital
firms in an effort to establish a reputation and successfully raise capital
for new funds."'0 7 Although Gompers focuses on the effect of reputation
in venture capital fundraising, his findings raise questions about venture
capital investing.'08 For example, why do entrepreneurs accept invest-
ments from young venture capital firms that grandstand? It is still un-
clear whether grandstanding has negative long-term effects on venture-
backed companies, but Gompers' data suggests that investors in venture
capital funds may bear much of the cost of grandstanding through lower
equity stakes in the portfolio companies.'09
In the context of venture capital investing, most commentators ac-
knowledge a role for reputation, but the analysis tends to be anecdotal.
For example, Bernard Black and Ronald Gilson claim that the market
for reputation is efficient based on the following attributes of the ven-
ture capital community: (1) there are relatively few venture capitalists,
(2) venture capitalists are geographically concentrated, (3) venture capi-
talists often specialize in companies that are geographically proximate to
the offices of the venture capitalists, and (4) venture capitalists are re-
peat players, both in investing and fundraising."0 Although Black and
Gilson assume that information is transmitted efficiently in such a tight-
knit community-a claim that seems to comport with anecdotal accounts
of Silicon Valley--they do not attempt to describe in detail "how infor-
mation is initially distributed""' or "how (and how much) efficiency is
achieved given the initial distribution of information."" 2 In short, they
do not offer a theory about how entrepreneurs obtain information re-
garding venture capitalist reputation and whether the information that
they obtain is credible.
The debate over the role of reputation in venture capital contract-
ing must ultimately be informed by empirical evidence about the proc-
esses used by entrepreneurs to locate and evaluate venture capitalists.
Nevertheless, the study of capital markets suggests two principles that
will advance the understanding of the market for venture capitalist repu-
tation.
First, "[t]he lower the cost of particular information, the wider will
be its distribution, the more effective will be the ... market mechanism
operating to reflect it in [reputation], and the more efficient will be the
market with respect to it.,,"5 Gilson and Kraakman identify three catego-
ries of information costs: acquisition, processing, and verification."
4
107 Id. at 134.
"a Gompers acknowledges this connection. See id. at 155.
'0 Id. at 150-53.
" Black & Gilson, supra note 3, at 256-57.
"' Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 102, at 593.
112 Id.
'1 Id. at 593.
"' Id. at 594.
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Without delving into the nuances of each category, it is reasonable to as-
sume that entrepreneurs face substantial information costs and that re-
ducing such costs will improve the efficiency of the market for venture
capitalist reputation.
Second, if the market for venture capitalist reputation is to operate
efficiently, mechanisms must exist to convey information about reputa-
tion to entrepreneurs. Information about venture capitalist reputation
comes primarily from three sources: venture capitalists (self promotion),
intermediaries (i.e., lawyers, accountants, other entrepreneurs, and
friends), and the media (particularly those publications such as Entrepre-
neur, The Red Herring, and Inc., which focus a great deal of attention on
the venture capital community). Like the mechanisms of capital market
efficiency described by Gilson and Kraakman, these mechanisms
"facilitate the eventual 'reflection' of information into" reputation." 5
Moreover, like the information necessary to determine price in capital
markets, the information that must be incorporated in reputation in-
cludes not only information that is well known to members of the ven-
ture capital community but also information that is known to only a few
people.
Despite these similarities between capital markets and the market
for venture capitalist reputation, other factors call the efficiency of the
market for venture capitalist reputation into question. The most appar-
ent reason to suspect inefficiency in this market is the absence of a cen-
tralized location-like a stock exchange-where various assessments of
venture capitalist reputation can be "traded." Gilson and Kraakrnan
identify four "general forms of mechanisms" that transmit information
in capital markets: universally informed trading, professionally informed
trading, derivatively informed trading, and uninformed trading."6 The
emphasis on trading is not coincidental. Only by trading is information
from disparate sources gathered and evaluated. By trading in a central-
ized location, capital markets assemble all relevant information into a
single measure. Venture capital markets lack this feature. Thus, one
would expect much different measures of venture capitalist reputation
from transaction to transaction.
Other, less obvious, differences between capital markets and the
reputational markets point toward inefficiencies in the market for ven-
ture capitalist reputation. For example, people who have information
regarding a venture capitalist-including, most importantly, entrepre-
neurs who have dealt with the venture capitalist-will not necessarily
have an incentive to convey that information to future entrepreneurs.
This is in a stark contrast to the capital markets, where people who have
private information regarding stock prices may profit by bringing that
information to the market. In addition, a venture capitalist is under no
115 Id. at 588-89.
,," Id. at 566.
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obligation--comparable to the disclosure provisions of the federal secu-
rities law-to provide information to the public regarding its reputation.
Finally, intermediaries such as lawyers, accountants, and other entrepre-
neurs may have varied reasons (including self-interested reasons) for
recommending one venture capitalist over another, and those reasons
may bear no relationship to the "fundamentals" of the venture capitalist.
In short, it seems likely that even in a close community such as Silicon
Valley, other structural features of the market for venture capitalist repu-
tation inhibit the efficiency of that market.
B. Venture Capital on the Web
The Web promises to improve the efficiency of both the market for
reputation and the related market for information. The efficiency of the
market for reputation should be improved by partially centralizing the
source of information, and the efficiency of the market for information
should be improved by lowering the cost of information. To facilitate
consideration of the Web's effect on venture capital contracting, the fol-
lowing sections employ the services of a hypothetical entrepreneur
named Kim, a software engineer who has worked for several years for an
established technology firm in Silicon Valley. Pursuing a longtime
dream, she left her employer on good terms several months ago to de-
velop her own revolutionary ideas for Internet applications. She is now
the chief executive officer of a new technology company, which she
founded with the assistance of three associates from her former em-
ployer.
She has been working with an attorney at the Venture Law Group, a
prominent law firm located in Menlo Park, California."' Although her
attorney has been very helpful in shepherding her through the initial
stages of company formation, she feels compelled to educate herself
generally about the legal and business issues that lie ahead. But a steady
diet of fourteen- to twenty-hour days building her new firm leaves no
time for formal education and little time to explore the stacks at the lo-
cal public library. Nevertheless, she knows that a virtual library sits on
"7 The firm's home page announces:
Venture Law Group is a 70+ lawyer law firm which specializes in representing
deal-intensive technology companies, both public and private, and the venture
capital funds and investment banking firms that finance them.
Our headquarters are located in Menlo Park, California, with more than 50 ven-
ture capital funds within a half mile or so of our building.
Founded by groups of senior technology lawyers from three of Silicon Valley's
leading law firms (Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, Brobeck, Phleger & Har-
rison, and Morrison & Foerster), VLG concentrates on helping technology
companies get started, find financing, and structure and grow their businesses.
Venture Law Group (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.venlaw.com>.
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top of her desk, and she decides to explore the world of venture capital
by searching the Web.
Searching the Web for information can be an epiphany. Through
the popular Alta Vista Search Network... using the words "venture capi-
tal," Kim retrieves over 23,000 documents She finds that Excite,"' In-
foseek, 20 and Yahool 2 all have pages dedicated to links to venture capi-
tal firms and other resources on venture capital. She quickly realizes that
anyone seeking a crash course in venture capital could hardly do better
than a few hours on the Web.
1. General Information
As a first-time entrepreneur, Kim wants to begin at the beginning.
She quickly locates several organizations that provide information about
the venture capital process generally. These materials serve as a useful
introduction to the unique world of venture capital. Similar materials
are sometimes provided on the Web by venture capital firms, discussed
below. Although Kim realizes that she will want more tailored advice
once the process begins in earnest, these Web sites provide many of the
tools necessary for a more informed and detailed search for venture
capital.
The Capital Venture Web site attempts to answer the question "what
is venture capital?" with helpful materials under the Venture Capital 101
link. '2 The materials include additional links entitled Overview of the Fi-
nancial Indust,' 23 Buy-Side of the Financial Industry,12 4 Stages of Venture Capi-
tal Investment,' and Understanding Venture Capital 26The Venture Capital
Resource Library (VCRL) links users to venture capital firms (organized
both alphabetically and by industry sector), law firms, accounting firms,
and other service providers; a business plan template that entrepreneurs
"8 See Alta Vista, A Digital Internet Service (visited Mar. 21, 1998)
<http://altavista.digital.com>.
119 See Excite Business & Investing (visited Mar. 21, 1998)
<http://quicken.excite.com/small_business/answers/?channel=&topic=l &subtopic
=22#8>.
120See Infoseek Business Channel (visited Mar. 21, 1998)
<http://www.infoseek.com/Business/Small_Business/Finance_abusiness/Venture_
capital?tid=451>.
121 See Yahoo! (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.yahoo.com/Business andEconomy/
FinanceandInvestment/Fmancing/Corporate- Financing/Venture-Capital>.
2 Capital Venture (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.capitalventure.com/
cvindustry.htm>.
'" (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.capitalvenmure.com/cvindustry.htm#Overview Fi-
nancia p.
' (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.capitalventure.com/cvindusty.htm#Buy Side>.
'" (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.capitalventure.com/cvindustry.htm#Stages>.
11 (visited Mar. 21, 1998) hbttp://www.capitalventure.com/cvindustry.
htm#UnderstandingVC>.
1998]
164 THEJOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW
can use to write a business plan; securities and tax laws; and financial
market information. 
2 7
In addition to obtaining information online, Kim finds that she can
use the Web to contact other entrepreneurs or industry groups that may
lend assistance. For example, American Entrepreneurs for Economic
Growth-which boasts over 10,000 emerging growth companies as
members-hosts a Web site with information about the group's activities,
including a newsletter containing recent developments of interest to
emerging growth comn anies. 12 Many other sites promote interaction
among entrepreneurs.
2. Venture Capital Firms
It doesn't take Kim long to find a host of Web sites featuring venture
capital firms. All of the sites contain basic information about the firms:
physical locations, investment specializations, and investment strategies.
In addition, many of the sites contain extensive information about part-
ners in the firm and the firm's portfolio companies. Finally, all of the
sites contain contact information, often in the form of an e-mail address
accessible by clicking a link available on the site. Some even outline cri-
teria for submission of a business plan.
Kim observes that most of the Web sites seem to be directed at en-
trepreneurs, and she wonders whether the venture capital firms really
expect to attract clients through a Web page.'" Her attorney is busy con-
tacting venture capitalists on her behalf, and she had the impression that
most successful entrepreneurs met venture capitalists through such an
intermediary.
Many of the Web sites constructed by venture capital firms provide
more than information about the firms. They also attempt to educate
12 Venture Capital Resource Libray (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.vfinance.com>.
" The Web site proclaims: "AEEG's mission is to serve as a united voice for en-
trepreneurs on public policy issues that affect emerging growth companies and to
strengthen public policy support through education about the critical role emerging
growth companies play in the U.S. economy-i.e., job creation, technology develop-
ment, innovation and global competitiveness." AEEG, General Information (visited
Feb. 11, 1998) <http://www.aeeg.org/fact.html>.
' See, e.g., The Entrepreneur Network (visited Mar. 21, 1998)
<http://TENonline.org>; MIT Enterpreneurs Club (last modified Nov. 1, 1995)
<http://www.mit.edu:8001/activities/e-club/e-club-home.html>; The Vine, Venture
Information Network for Entrepreneurs (visited Mar. 21, 1998)
<http://www.thevine.com>.
" The answer to this question seems to be a resounding "Yes." In an informal
survey of venture capital firms on the Web, which appears in the Appendix, the firms
were asked, "Why did your firm construct a Web page?" Given several nonexclusive
options, over 80% responded, "We expect entrepreneurs to locate our firm through
the Web page." In addition, over 90% checked, "We expect entrepreneurs who have
contacted our firm through other means to use the Web page as a source of addi-
tional information about our firm." Moreover, over 97% of the responding firms in-
dicated that entrepreneurs had contacted the firm through the Web page. See infra
Appendix.
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entrepreneurs about the venture capital process. Kim is especially im-
pressed by a site hosted by Accel Partners,' which provides helpful in-
formation on Advice for First Time Entrepreneurs,'" How to Win a Venture
Capitalist-the five characteristics we look for in entrepreneurs,'" Challenges in
Building World Class Technology Companies,' and CommunicationsWeek and
InternetWeek Columns.'35 In addition to these materials, the Accel site pro-
vide links to other sites containing information about venture ca ital.'
Alliance Technology Ventures provides links to articles,'37 books, and
other information about venture capital, as well as detailing the "Top
Ten Myths About Venture Capital"'1 Kim locates many sites hosted by
venture capital firms that provide resource links for entrepreneurs.140
3. News Publications
Once Kim's attorney succeeds in setting up a meeting with a partner
at Sequoia Capital-a prominent venture capital firm located in Menlo
Park-Kim begins her search in earnest. Of course, she knows all about
Sequoia's biggest success, Cisco Systems. Everyone in Silicon Valley
knows about Cisco Systems, which has had an average annual return of
177% since 1987!' 4' But Kim wants more detailed information.
.. Accel Partners, For Entrepreneurs (visited Mar. 21, 1998)
<http://www.accel.com/entrepreneurs>.
,n (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.accel.com/entrepreneurs/advice.html>.
IS (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.accel.com/entrepreneurs/how_towin.hnl>.
(visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.accel.com/entrepreneurs/worldsclass.html>.
(visited Mar. 21, 1998) < http://www.accel.com/entrepreneurs/articles.html>.
'S Id.
,37 Alliance Technology Ventures, ATV Library (visited Mar. 21, 1998)
<http://www.atv.com/links/articles.html>.
'3 Alliance Technology Ventures, Good Books for Entrepreneurs (visited Mar. 21,
1998) <http://www.atv.com/links/books.html>.
'" Alliance Technology Ventures, Top Ten Myths about Venture Capital (visited
Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.atv.com/links/library/topten.html>. The myths are:
1. Venture capitalists want to take control of my company.
2. Venture capitalists load their deals with all sorts of unfair terms.
3. Venture capitalists are only interested in the numbers.
4. Venture capitalists have unrealistic performance expectations.
5. Venture capitalists are always harping on "exit strategy."
6. Venture capitalists give me a lower valuation than a private placement.
7. Venture capitalists won't invest in small deals like mine.
8. Venture capitalists are too quick to pull the plug when trouble starts.
9. Venture capitalists don't like signing non-disclosure agreements.
10. Venture capitalists are impossible to get on the phone.
Id.
140 See, e.g., Draper FisherJurvetson, Resources for the Entrepreneur (visited Mar. 21,
1998) <http://www.DraperVC.com/Resources.html> (listing various resources for
the entrepreneur); Venture Capital Online (visited Mar. 21, 1998)
<http://www.vcapital.com> (providing networking and an information exchange be-
tween investors and entrepreneurs).
,' Anthony B. Perkins, Don Valentine's Net Big Bet Is on CCube Mmryrtem 11 RED
HERRING ON1NE (June 1994) <http://www.herring.com/mag/issuel 1/bet.html>.
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Her attorney has worked with the Sequoia partner before, and he
provides useful pointers about the partner's style. He gives Kim detailed
instructions about what to expect at the first meeting and mentions in
passing that she will be on her own. Like many venture capitalists, this
one does not like to have the attorney present at the first meeting. When
Kim learns this news, her desire for information about Sequoia in-
creases, and she turns back to the Web.
Sequoia's Web site is fairly predictable,' 2 but through it Kim finds
that Sequoia has financed two other firms where she has friends. She
makes a note to call them and ask about their experiences. As expected,
Sequoia provides no negative information (the type of information that
might be most useful to her).' 4She is looking for a more objective view,
and she realizes that Sequoia has probably attracted some attention over
the years from the local financial press.
Several news publications follow the venture capital community
closely. The Red Herring is a magazine that bills itself as "the premier pro-
vider of business information for the technology and entertainment in-
dustries." Naturally, many of its stories relate to the venture capital in-
dustry. The companion Web site, called Herning.coM,'" is searchable back
to 1993 and contains articles about many venture-backed companies and
the venture capital firms that financed them. Similar online services are
provided by magazines such as Upside,'45 Inc.,'46 Entrepreneurial Edge,147
ZDNet,1 48 and Worth 49
Kim begins her search at Herring.corn, where she locates an article
describing the different policies of venture capitalists with respect to
ownership by entrepreneurs.' 5 The article warns thatJim Clark, the leg-
endary founder of Silicon Graphics and Netscape, learned about venture
capital in the school of hard knocks:
When you talk to Jim Clark it is clear that he still harbors some
resentment for giving up 40% of his stock in Silicon Graphics to
The Mayfield Fund and the other first-round VCs for only
142 SeeSequoia Capita (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.sequoiacap.com/index.shtml>.
"' For example, the Web site for the venture capital firm Burr, Egan, Deleage &
Co. does not indicate that the firm provided financing for Discovery Toys. See Burr,
Egan, Deleage & Co. (last modified May 21, 1997) <http://www.bedco.com>. The
omission is understandable because the founder of Discovery Toys sued Burr Egan.
See Nancy Rutter, Greer v. Nemeth, INC.,July 1990, at 76.
.4. Welcome to Red Herring Online (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.herring.com>.
See Upside (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.upside.com>.
See Inc. Online. 7he Web Site for Growing Companies (visited Mar. 21, 1998)
<http://www.inc.coni>.
147 SeeEntrepreneurialEdge Online (visited Mar. 21,1998) <http://www.edgeonline.com>.
See Zdnet (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.zdnet.com>.
149 See WorthOnline-Financial Intelligence (visited Mar. 21, 1998)
<http://www.worth.com>.
1w Anthony B. Perkins, You Too Can Be a Winner!, 32 RED HERRING ONLINE (June
1996) <http://www.herring.com/mag/issue32/angler.html>.
[Vol. 2:1
VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTING
$800,000. "By the time SGI went through a couple of public of-
ferings, I ended up with only 1% of the company. In retrospect,
that kind of hurts," Mr. Clark told The Herring last fall.,5'
Fortunately, Kim thinks to herself, she is not scheduled to meet with
the Mayfield Fund. According to the article, she will be much happier
with Sequoia Capital, which has a long track record, having financed
Apple, Oracle, Cisco Systems, and Yahoo!, among others:
Sequoia still makes its money the old-fashioned way. Their goal,
as Sequoia partner Mike Moritz is happy to remind us, is "to
start wicked infernos with a single match rather than 10 million
gallons of kerosene." Translation: Sequoia has a long history of
launching huge companies with very little capital.... Sequoia
accomplishes this feat by preaching frugality, building business
plans that focus on profitability, and keeping their entrepre-
neurs honest.
Mr. Moritz admits that the timing of Sequoia's investments is
also critical to their success strategy. 'We tend to be more fo-
cused on market growth potential than most VCs," he says. "But
we don't want to invest into a market until it has developed
enough to support a profitable company." As we can see with
Yahoo!, this approach has terrific benefits for the people who
start companies, and the limited partners who invest in Sequoia.
So there you have it, a way for everyone to win. Isn't entrepre-
neurial capitalism great.... if it's done right?
52
Of course, just because it is written in The Red Herring doesn't make
it true. But Kim feels comforted by these war stories, and she is gaining
more sophistication about the issues that are likely arise in the venture
capital process.
The initial report about Sequoia is encouraging. Kim moves on.
Searching Upside.con she finds a recent profile of Sequoia's founder and
most prominent partner, Don Valentine.'5 Although she is not sched-
uled to meet with Valentine, she is intrigued and wants to know more.
Worth magazine features another long story about Valentine. She reads:
A dense veil of mystique and folklore surrounds the seasoned
venturers who helped create the entrepreneurial petri dish of
Silicon Valley. Donald Valentine, the 63-year-old founder of Se-
quoia Capital, is particularly decorated by mythos. There are
rich tales of his volcanic boardroom proclamations and of
young entrepreneurs (sometimes the stories have a salesman or
a journalist) becoming so intimidated by Valentine's exacting
personal style that they pass out on the table (or throw up or
burst into tears). This apocrypha is more than matched by the
1' Id.
152 Id.
" Karen Southwick, He Keeps on Ticking (last modified July 18, 1997)
<http://www.upside.com/texis/mvm/story?id=34712clb6c>.
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verifiable stories of Valentine making himself, his stable of
young genius-entrepreneurs, and many investors in his VC
funds extremely rich.'54
Her attorney didn't mention anything about throwing up or passing
out at the meeting! Of course, this is all "apocrypha," Kim assures her-
self, but after reading a bit further, she finds the following "testimonial"
to Don Valentine:
"Don Valentine is one of the most influential people in my life,"
[Trip Hawkins, founder of video game machine company 3DO]
says now. "He helped me grow up as a businessman. If you can't
survive the hazing Don puts you through, then you certainly
can't survive the crap that comes your way as a company CEO.
Even now, I wear Don Valentine in my brain. Sometimes I sense
that a new idea must be crushed and people must be sent away
to get their shit together-so I simply turn into Don.
"At the beginning it isn't easy," Hawkins says. "When I was writ-
ing the Electronic Arts business plan at 3000 Sand Hill, Don
took me to his golf club for lunch. 'If I wanted to run your
company,' he said to me, 'why in the world would I need you?'
He basically announced, We are about to start a relationship in
which I will savagely beat you. If you roll over, Don teaches, you
won't be successful. He's kind of like the professor in the movie
The Paper Chase. But it's hard. Entrepreneurs come from op-
timism. Don does not come from optimism. He's the yang to
the entrepreneur's yin. "'
"Hazing"? "Savagely beat you"? Professor Kingsfield? The meeting
with Sequoia is sounding a lot less enticing than it did just minutes ago.
But she isn't meeting with Valentine, anyway. Is she? Kim makes a note
to ask her attorney whether Valentine has a habit of appearing in meet-
ings to which he was not invited.'5 She also wants to know whether the
other Sequoia partners imitate Valentine. 57 Firm culture is a powerful
thing.
5 Donald Katz, Rise of Silicon Patriots (last modified Jan. 1996)
<http://www.worth.com/articles/Z9601FO2.html>.
15" Id.
"5 The article she is reading sends a flare:
The younger partners at Sequoia say that when news of a hot young company in
need of funds comes into the office, Valentine is the first to hear the fire bells
and hit the north-south racetrack of a highway that is Interstate 280. He still
loves to punch holes in slick presentations offered by "guys in power suits, refer-
ring to their mothers and pastors and showing slides."
Id.
,.57 Again, the article suggests an answer. Referring to Michael Moritz, a young
Sequoia partner, the article states, "Moritz seems to have internalized Valentine's
axioms." Id. But later in her search, Kim finds an interview with Moritz in which he
describes his partners as follows:
Don [Valentine] is a cool and very rational thinker when it comes to analyzing
companies and different situations, Pierre [LaMond] has a tremendous com-
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Discouraged, but realizing that she is among the fortunate few en-
trepreneurs who will ever land an interview with Sequoia, Kim plows on.
In Herring.com, she finds an interview with Jerry Yang, one of the found-
ers of Yahoo!, describing his experience with Sequoia:
The first time we sat down with Sequoia, Mike asked "So, how
much are you going to charge subscribers?" and Dave and I
looked at each other and said, "Well, it's going to be a long
conversation." But two hours later, we convinced them that Ya-
hoo! should be free, and I think we're the only company Se-
quoia's funding that has a free product. Overall, the relation-
ship with Sequoia has been a very light-hearted one. We had
heard about the big conference room with thick padded chairs
and posters all over the wall of all their IPOs. But working with
Moritz, who is a younger guy, made things easier. We still get
strange looks when we walk around Sequoia, especially from
Don Valentine, who still asks, "What are you guys doing again?"
My only other interaction with Don Valentine has been trying to
fix his Mosaic browser and him giving me golf ips.
"Light-hearted"? Maybe Jerry Yang is given special treatment, but
this sounds hopeful. Moving beyond the personality issues, however, Kim
finds more clues about how Sequoia views the world. In an interview with
The Red Herring, Michael Moritz (Yahoo!'s venture capitalist) is asked
about the perception that Sequoia is "the Los Angeles Raiders of venture
capital-the tough guys who are quicker than other firms to boot the
CEO or pull the financial plug."" 9 To Kim's chagrin, Moritz seems to
agree:
We are congenitally incapable of pouring good money after
bad. Some people, for their own purposes, will thrust us into a
position to be harbingers of bad news to management, which is
all right. But we do not want to continue propping up a com-
pany if we think its chances for success have evaporated. We
would be wasting our money as individuals and wasting the
money of our limited partners. There have been very few in-
stances when we decided to stop funding a company and have
regretted it.
All of this sounds perfectly rational.., from the viewpoint of the
venture capitalist. But Kim cannot help but imagine herself at the receiv-
petitive drive, and Gordon [Russell] radiates a friendly courtliness. Contemplat-
ing those attributes is very helpful as I think about how I should conduct myself
in the venture business. But I don't believe in modeling myself after one particu-
lar bronze bust.
Anthony B. Perkins, The Young & The Restlas of Technology Finance, 6 RED HERRING
ONuNE (Nov. 1993) <http://www.herring.com/mag/issueO6/young.html>.
'a Found You on Yahoo', 24 RED HERRING ONuNE (Oct. 1995)
<http://www.herring.com/mag/issue24/yahoo.html>.
1- See Perkins, supra note 157.
'Go Id.
1998]
170 THE JOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW
ing end of the message. When she learns from the interview that Sequoia
looks for "[firugality, competitiveness, confidence, and paranoia" in
the presidents of its portfolio companies, she muses, "Three out of four
ain't bad!""
C. The Future of Venture Capital Contracting
Kim managed to gather a fair amount of information about Sequoia
Capital in a very short time. The information is largely anecdotal, but it
has raised her concentration level on the issue of forced exit (one of the
prominent moral hazard problems) and has caused her to wonder
whether she could ever get her company back after signing an agree-
ment with Sequoia (the adverse selection problem). Even though Kim
has an attorney who is experienced in venture capital transactions, her
11 Id.
Anyone who finds Kim's information gathering process fanciful should con-
sider a recent Price Waterhouse survey of 377 CEOs from among the world's 2000
largest companies. Among other things, the survey found that: "Sixty-four percent
indicated that they use the Internet for reasons other than e-mail. Forty-six percent
of the executives personally had used the Internet five or more days out of the previ-
ous month while 27 percent had logged on more than 10 days out of the previous
month." Price Waterhouse, Global CEOs Say Electronic Commerce Will Dramatically Im-
pact Competition (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://www.pw.com/us/304a.htm>. It is rea-
sonable to assume that high-tech entrepreneurs would use the Internet more often
than the CEOs surveyed. In addition, entrepreneurs consider value-added services
when negotiating a venture capital investment. The following story is illustrative:
[SItartups with the right technology and team can play VC firms against each
other to win ever-higher valuations. Who, for instance, will bag Tumbleweed
Software, Inc.? The Redwood City-based startup, which makes software that al-
lows companies to send documents securely over the Internet, has pitched 20-
plus Silicon Valley firms to raise $6 million. Now, 30-year-old CEO Jeffrey C.
Smith gets to handpick his investors. "At this point, everyone's money is green,"
Smith says. "Now, its about who would be the best partner."
On a whiteboard, he divides his suitors into five categories: in, hot, warm, cold,
and out. The first cut is easy: Hambrecht & Quist, which manages a fund for
Adobe Systems Inc., will win a lead position with Bessemer Venture Partners and
original investor Draper Fisher Jurvetson. He dismisses the "colds" and "outs,"
including Tony Mayfield Fund, which will invest only if Smith agrees to relin-
quish the helm, a request often made of bright but inexperienced entrepre-
neurs. The "warms" are largely axed, too-one simply because the partner on
the deal got sick, another because of too few connections.
Days later, the action escalates. Venture newcomer Generation Partners raises
the ante with a valuation worth $4 million more than H&Q's. At the same time,
Microsoft Corp. board member David F. Marquardt, who runs August capital, of-
fers $3 million less but brings access to his blue-chip contacts. "Marquardt is
right about his value," says Smith. "But I'm not sure he's $3 million right." When
the dust clears, Smith snags a higher valuation than originally expected, and a
total of $7 million in capital. H&Q kicks in $3.5 million; Bessemer puts in $2 mil-
lion, with Draper Fisher taking the remaining $1.5 million. Generation, late to
the party and lacking marquee value, loses out.
Linda Himelstein, The Great Hunt for Hot Ideas: What starts with a bagel may end with
another Yahoo!, Bus. Wi., Aug. 25, 1997, at 106.
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concern with these issues will be important to the ultimate outcome of
the contracting process. It is in this manner that the Web will affect fu-
ture venture capital contracting.
Before attempting a more detailed discussion of how the Web might
be expected to alter the venture capital contracting process, it is useful
to briefly explore how venture capital contracts have changed over time.
When Mark Suchman analyzed venture capital financing agreements in
Silicon Valley, he observed not only that the agreements fell into several
contractual archetypes, described above, but that the use of those con-
tracts changed significantly over time. 6s The contracts in his sample
ranged from 1976 to 1990. Over that time, venture capital contracts
evolved "in rough chronological sequence ... from Idiosyncratic con-
tracts to Weak contracts to Pre-programmed contracts to Legalistic con-
tracts to Close contracts to Flexible contracts."'"4 In short, the contracts
evolved from the simple to the complex. Recent contracts generally con-
tained more detailed specification of rights and seemed to contemplate
a more intimate relationship between venture capitalists and entrepre-
neurs than older contracts.
Suchman's data set ends in 1990, the same year Sahlman's descrip-
tion of venture capital contracts was published. No one has attempted to
provide a more recent examination of venture capital contracts. Al-
though all six types of financing agreements identified by Suchman sur-
vived through 1990, the popularity of each form was relatively short-
lived. Suchman states, "contractual archetypes appear distinctly 'faddish,'
with the popularity of specific financing models rising and then declin-
ing in a fairly consistent" manner. '6 It is entirely possible, therefore, that
new types of venture capital financing agreements have been developed
in the past seven years. This does not seem likely, however, because ven-
ture capital contracting appeared quite mature by 1990 and subsequent
innovations in contract forms had long since ceased. r In addition, one
would expect to see some indication of that trend in popular accounts of
venture capital or in the writings of venture capital lawyers. None exist.
It is more likely, however, that there have been changes in the fre-
quency of use of the various types over time. At the conclusion of Such-
man's data set, two types of financing agreements-close contracts and
1'6 Suchman, supra note 45, at 251.
164 id.
" Id. at 253.
'6 Id. at 259. Suchman states:
By the end of [1990], the structuration process appears to be nearing comple-
tion. Most new contracts in these final years embrace one of two well-defined
and highly-elaborated archetypes, and deviance/innovation remains rare. Thus,
out of the complex dynamics [that characterized Silicon Valley in the late 1970s
and early 1980s], the community ultimately arrives at a fairly narrow range of
highly-typified and widely-diffused contractual models. In a word, venture capital
financing becomes institutionalized.
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flexible contracts--dominated venture capital financing. Between them,
they accounted for roughly seventy-five percent of all venture capital fi-
nancing agreements in 1990.167 Suchman notes that these two contract
types were still ascendant, while all of the other contract types were in
decline. "-
In speculating about the effect of the Web on venture capital con-
tracts, one would want to have some notion of the factors that have trig-
gered past changes in venture capital contracts. Suchman notes that ven-
ture capital contracts moved from short-term, arm's-length relationships
(weak and pre-programmed contracts) prior to 1985 to long-term,
hands-on partnerships (close and flexible contracts) thereafter and sug-
gests that this move may have been prompted by a "modest retrench-
ment" in venture capital in Silicon Valley from 1984 through 1986. Le-
galistic contracts became very prominent during this period, reaching a
peak in 1985.'G' It is possible, therefore, that the retrenchment provided
the impetus for more elaborate contracts, and that the legalistic con-
tracts acted as a transition to the permanent adoption of more elaborate
contract forms.
Such a progression seems quite plausible. More elaborate contracts
may have been an inevitable part of the maturation of venture capital
contracting. Certainly, the subsequent boom in venture capital has not
resulted in a revival of simple venture capital contracts, so it would be
wrong to attribute too much of the elaboration of venture capital con-
tracts to the short retrenchment.
Suchman also analyzes the influence of informational intermediar-
ies, such as law firms and venture capital funds, arguing that these
groups have a profound impact on choice of contract form.' In the end,
Suchman concludes that the evolution of contractual forms is caused by
many factors: "Temporal, institutional and economic factors all exert
significant influences on the selection of contractual models."'7 '
Changes in venture capital contracts will be further encouraged by
the increasing bargaining power of entrepreneurs. For most would-be
entrepreneurs, venture capital financing is notoriously difficult to ob-
tain. Then again, most would-be entrepreneurs have terrible business
ideas. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the venture capital industry is
highly cometitive on the supply side, especially when a "hot" company
is involved. In addition, venture capital is attracting record amounts of
1'67 Id. at 257.
1G8 Id.
160 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 285.
'72 Steve Kaufman, The Red Carpet Treatment: Venture Capitalists, Fresh Wth Cash,
Compete Harder to Attract the Best and Savviest Entrepreneurs, SAN JoSE MERCURY NEWS,
Nov. 18, 1996, at 1E; REID, supra note 93, at 144 (describing the financing of Ma-
rimba, Inc., stating, "[t]he company had its pick among some of the Valley's finest
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money, and venture capital firms compete not only among themselves,
but with other providers of private equity, including "angels"'" and cor-
porations, such as Adobe Systems, Intel, Cisco Systems, Informix, and
Netscape. Venture capitalists also compete with other forms of start-up
financing, including "bootstrapping, commercial lending, 5 and, in-
• • -- •176
creasingly, public equity markets. Moreover, businesses that ultimately
are funded through venture capital usually are financed by a syndication
of venture capital firms. Syndication implies that the entrepreneur could
have selected financing from any one of multiple venture capitalists. In-
deed, the industry seems to recognize that entrepreneurs have choices.'"
Finally, an entrepreneur may decide that the costs associated with ven-
ture capital are simply not worth the effort The ability of the entrepre-
neur to exit provides a check on venture capitalist opportunism.
The future of venture.capital contracts is impossible to predict with
any degree of certainty. Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis suggests
some possibilities. For example, the shift in bargaining power in favor of
entrepreneurs, combined with the improved market for venture capital-
ist reputation, should allow entrepreneurs to make better choices prior
to entering into a venture capital relationship, thus addressing the ad-
verse selection problem ex ante. Increased bargaining power also may
enable entrepreneurs to bargain more frequently for the ability to ad-
dress adverse selection ex post, through discretionary redemption provi-
sions. With respect to the moral hazard problem, the improved market
funds, and in the end went with Netscape's elite backer Kleiner Perkins"). In a re-
cent novel set in Silicon Valley, Po Bronson describes a venture capitalist contemplat-
ing an investment in an Internet company:
Eighteen months ago, a startup that designed Internet routers had come to
Marquee looking for a million bucks, and Marquee had done the usual venture
capital games-stalled, checked around for competition, tried to negotiate more
shares for their money. In the meantime, the Internet router market had
boomed, and the company funded its own growth through profits. They stopped
returning Travis's phone calls. Now it was about time to go public. If Marquee
hadn't diddled around and just given them the money, that million would soon
be worth twenty. Travis Grissom wouldn't make the same mistake twice.
Po BRONSON, THE FIRsT $20 MILuON is ALWAYS THE HARDEsT 184 (1997).
'73 Little is written about angel investors. For an anecdotal account of angel in-
vesting, see Michael S. Malone, Angels in the Valley (last modified Apr. 1997)
<http://www.upside.com/texis/mvm/story?id=34712c19f>.
'7' "Bootstrapping" is the process of financing a business from the business' own
revenues. Obviously, bootstrapping is unfeasible for many entrepreneurs, who are
unable to provide the initial capital necessary to get a product to market.
' Commercial lending has traditionally been inaccessible to high technology
companies, whose only assets tend to be intangible.
276 Christopher B. Barry & Adel M. Turki, Initial Public Offerings by Development
Stage Companies, 2J. SMALL& EMERGING Bus. L. 101 (1998).
'" See, e.g., Case & O'Grady, supra note 21, at 6-13 ("An entrepreneur will en-
counter only the disadvantages of venture capital if he does not exercise the same
diligence and judgment in carefully choosing venture capital partners as they use in
deciding where to invest their capital.").
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for venture capitalist reputation will increase the incentives of venture
capitalists to resist opportunistic behavior. A heightened sense of the
risks of accepting venture capital may cause entrepreneurs to demand
more explicit protections against opportunism, although it seems un-
likely that venture capitalists would forego their most powerful weapon,
staged financing. Finally, an improved market for reputation should af-
fect the pricing of venture capital investments.
V. CONCLUSION
The market for venture capitalist reputation is the glue that holds
the venture capital process together. Entrepreneurs face substantial
agency costs in "hiring" venture capitalists to perform value-added serv-
ices, and the explicit terms of venture capital contracts do not ade-
quately protect entrepreneurs against opportunism and incompetence.
Without the checks provided by the market for venture capitalist reputa-
tion, therefore, entrepreneurs would be virtually powerless to enforce
the promises of venture capitalists to provide value-added services.
Although the importance of the market for venture capitalist repu-
tation is often noted, it is rarely analyzed. This Article suggests that the
market for venture capitalist reputation is both informationally and fun-
damentally inefficient. Although mechanisms exist to convey informa-
tion about reputation to entrepreneurs, those mechanisms probably do
not result in an efficient market because of the absence of a centralized
location-like a stock exchange-where various assessments of venture
capitalist reputation can be "traded." The Web performs two functions
that improve the efficiency of the market for venture capitalist reputa-
tion: (1) it serves to centralize some reputational information and (2) it
lowers the cost of distributing information, thus expanding the scope of
its distribution.
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APPENDIX
Venture Capitalist Survey
Surveys were sent by electronic mail to over 100 venture capital firms,
and 41 firms responded.
Why did your firm construct a Web page? (Check all that apply.)
80.5% a. We expect entrepreneurs to locate our firm through the
Web page.
90.2% b. We expect entrepreneurs who have contacted our firm
through other means to use the Web page as a source of additional
information about our firm.
31.7% c. We expect the Web page to improve networking among
our portfolio companies.
39.0% d. We expect the Web page to increase our name recogni-
tion among other venture capitalists.
34.2% e. We expect the Web page to increase our name recogni-
tion among lawyers, accountants, and others who make referrals to
venture capital firms.
24.4% f. We expect investors to locate our firm through the Web
page.
19.5% g. We expect to communicate with our investors though the
Web page.
22.j h. Other. Please explain: [Common answers: entrepreneurs
expect it, it provides an information source to the entrepreneurial
community, and it provides up-to-date information about the firm.]
Which of the following have contacted your firm after
accessing your Web page? (Check all that apply.)
97.6% a. Entrepreneurs.
26.8% b. Investors.
22.0% c. Lawyers.
19.5% d. Accountants.
24.4% e. Venture capitalists.
36.6% f. Others. Please specify: [Common answers: prospective
employees, investment bankers,journalists, and professors.]
Has your firm funded any entrepreneurs who contacted your firm after
accessing your Web page?
14.6% Yes.
85.4% No.
What effect, if any, will the Internet have on venture capital financing?
[Answers to this question ranged from "None" or "Unknown" to ex-
tensive speculations about the future of venture capital financing.
Several respondents expressed their hope that the Web site would
allow entrepreneurs to target their funding requests to venture capi-
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talists with the proper specialization, but many noted that most
business plans submitted via the Web site were of inferior quality.
Some respondents thought that the Web would assist entrepreneurs
by providing easier access to information about venture capital fi-
nancing, perhaps even reducing the need for intermediaries. Many
respondents suggested that the Web would affect supply-side compe-
tition, either by providing better access to alternative forms of
startup financing, including angel investors or by extending the
reach of venture capitalists who are located outside of Silicon Val-
ley.]
